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Abstract

PROVISIONAL FICTIONS:
DISCONTINUOUS SELVES AND THE MAKING OF MEANING
by
Tara Roeder

Advisor: Meena Alexander
My project is an exploration of trauma-based meaning-making practices and reader response
across a variety of sites. By teasing out some of the complex connections among trauma,
narrative, and audience that may occur in spaces ranging from non-linear memoir to courtroom
testimony to the writing classroom, I engage with the inherently dialogic nature of making
meaning from trauma, and examine some of the ways in which women who engage in recursive,
embodied rhetorical practices can productively disrupt conventional expectations of the function
of trauma narratives. Chapter One examines the formal, linguistic, and philosophical choices
made by women memoirists who challenge the parameters of traditional narrative structure in
order to forge their own paths through contested issues of history, memory, and the body.
Chapter Two focuses on the public discourses surrounding stories of sexual assault, using reader
response theory to explore the possibilities available to witnesses who wish to resist the ways in
which the rhetoric of the courtroom can circumscribe responses to sexual assault narratives in
multiple forms, from memoir to testimony to mainstream media coverage. Chapter Three
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explores the interpretive possibilities for readers of trauma based narrative offered by nonoedipal psychoanalyst Sandor Ferenczi, who meaningfully revised Freud’s analytic approach to
trauma victims by stressing the need for empathy and active witnessing on behalf of the analyst.
Chapter Four delves into the realm of pedagogy, seeking to demonstrate through the use of
narrative practice some of the ways in which assignment design and modes of response can aid
in facilitating ethical and empathetic pedagogical interactions that may resonate both in and
beyond the composition classroom. I am ultimately invested in illuminating the role that both
genre and the body have in the construction of non-linear trauma narratives, as well as the role
community plays in re-thinking the linear reading practices often privileged in response to such
narratives in light of the work of innovative writers and theorists who challenge such practices in
their own projects.
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Introduction

1. Poetry makes a dwelling for us, a tent of words.
2. The tent has holes for wind to blow through, holes pierced by gunfire, by
arrows, by sharp stones.
3. It can be pitched on solid ground, or rolled up, borne through air, carried
over water. It can be unfurled here or there.
4. Inside the shelter we turn from the violence of history, to the lyric measures of
poetry, so that we can see again, eyes wiped free of blood; so that we can hear
again, the voices that allow us to be human.
5. Poetry makes ground in a vertiginous world.
6. All of this is true, and necessary for our survival.
7. None of this is true.
— “Pitching a Tent”
Meena Alexander

I have continually been intrigued by the paradox Meena Alexander describes above—the
idea that transforming experience into language is necessary for survival, while at the same time
realizing that this, like all of the stories we tell about ourselves—is a “fiction” in the classic sense
of the term. The word “fiction” has, at its root, the Latin word “fictio”— the act of making,
fashioning, or molding. A fiction is not necessarily a truth or a lie—it is a made thing, something
fashioned by humans to make meaning of a world that may often seem to operate in ways that
are antithetical to our desires, hopes, and sometimes our very existence.
Obviously, meaning can be produced in multiple ways: in a memoir; a performance;
courtroom testimony; a psychoanalytic session; an essay for a mandatory college class; a poem.
While translating lived experience into language is never a precise exercise, it becomes
especially complex in the face of traumatic experience—what Cathy Caruth describes as “the
story of a wound that cries out, that addresses itself to us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or a
truth that is not otherwise available” (4). Registered initially by the body, trauma takes time to,
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as Maxine Hong Kingston puts it in The Fifth Book of Peace, surface “up to the aware mind”
(260). Speaking to a group of Viet Nam veterans at a writing workshop, Kingston says:

The journey from the traumatic thing to the transforming words takes twenty
years. The conscious mind is waking up! You are now ready to gather the
smithereens, and narrate them into story. We’ll put that war into words, and
through language make sense, meaning, art of it, make something beautiful,
something good. (260)

For Kingston, it is not enough for the hidden to emerge; it must be faced and transformed.
Kingston urges the veterans in her workshop to take these gaps in their lives and narrate them,
make sense of them:
Each one of the veterans has had a moment when life blew apart [...] If he or she
could write the explosion, its every smithereen, and narrate what led to it and
came from it, the self and the world would become whole. They only need an
ethos, a simple set of positive ethics as ground and base. (336)
Narrating one’s own story can be an empowering act, a way of contextualizing the otherwise
senseless.
Yet making meaning from trauma does not necessarily follow a linear path. There is
obviously a danger in uncritically talking about “the unified self” or a “coherent story”—such
fictions ultimately betray the reality of experience, especially traumatic experience. My goal in
this project is to explore the ways in which the very concept of storytelling, specifically in the
face of trauma, can be viewed as provisional unity necessary for self-sustenance, rather than an
attempt at closure or finality. My impetus for the title of this project comes from a perhaps
unlikely source—modernist poet Wallace Stevens, who, in his poem “Of Modern Poetry”, writes
about the search for “what will suffice” (239). In “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” Stevens
posits a breaching of the gap between imagination and “reality,” the war of the poet and the war
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of the soldier, instructing us in the creation of our own “fictions.” “Abstract, pleasing, and
changing,” these fictions are our way of making sense of the world, of reconciling ourselves with
our environments. The creation of art, like the creation of “self,” is indeed necessary if we are
make meaning out of a chaos that wounds and fragments. Yet it is important to explore this
construct in a way that avoids dangerous totalizing tactics, and to instead view it as a means of
consistently negotiating and re-negotiating one’s positions in time and space. Feminist poet
Adrienne Rich equates the retelling of stories with women’s survival—a notion that
complements as it complicates Stevens’s claim that it is through fictions that we are able to
sustain ourselves.
Survivors of trauma may often find themselves constructing trauma narratives in private
journals or therapy sessions as part of their recovery process. But trauma narratives also surface
in public space in a variety of ways—through art and memoir; in our courtrooms and in our
classrooms. This project is an exploration of some of the stories that surface in these settings, and
the variety of responses they may provoke. Each chapter explores a particular site where trauma
and narrative intersect, allowing for the construction of provisional fictions that make meaning of
the otherwise senseless.
Chapter One examines the site of non-linear memoirs, in which traditional notions of plot
and chronology are disrupted by trauma. Contemporary women writers like Meena Alexander,
Susan Brison, Sophie Calle, Anne Carson, Teresa Hak Kyung Cha, and Maxine Hong Kingston
complicate the genre of memoir, allowing themselves to construct malleable and multiple selves
in their texts. As they inscribe both body and memory, the shape of their writing—fragmented;
recursive; elliptical—underscores the provisional nature of both self and narrative. The readers
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of such texts are called to inhabit a space of uncertainty, and invited to engage in meaningmaking practices that veer away from expectations of cohesion and linearity.
Chapter Two examines the discourse of rape in contemporary culture, paying special
attention to the courtroom setting, where rape victims are often required to tell cohesive, linear
narratives that underscore their blamelessness if they hope to be believed. Because of deeply
entrenched cultural myths about rape, the type of story often required for the successful
prosecution of perpetrators may require rape victims to construct narratives that do not
accurately reflect their lived experience. Writers such as Susan Brison, Patricia Weaver
Francisco, and Alice Sebold engage with the complex politics of rape and its telling in their
memoirs. While constructing stories that will suffice in the courtroom setting remains an
important task for many rape victims, such stories may ultimately have to be relinquished and rewritten in order to revise prevailing cultural perceptions of rape, its perpetrators and its victims.
The memoirs of rape survivors thus come to function as a different—and necessary—type of
public testimony.
Chapter Three considers the psychoanalytic setting, examining the significance of Sandor
Ferenczi’s work on trauma and its treatment both in and beyond the therapeutic environment.
Ferenczi re-wrote the hierarchical analytic paradigm established by Freud, insisting on the role of
the analyst as a compassionate partner rather than a detached authority. He also resisted Freud’s
position of disbelief in the face of childhood sexual assault narratives. Ferenczi’s own
narrative—largely buried for years by the psychoanalytic establishment—offers a powerful
counter-history of abuse-related trauma and its treatment. Ferenczi’s work has significance
beyond the analytic setting as well. Scholars and teachers who employ Ferenczian approaches
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may find new and productive ways of engaging with texts by moving beyond what Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick terms a “paranoid” position.
Chapter Four offers a personal narrative of my experience in the college composition
classroom, looking at some of the ways in which reparative pedagogical approaches have shaped
the writing and response that takes place in my courses. In Living the Narrative Life: Stories as a
Tool for Meaning Making, composition scholar Gian Pagnucci points out that “The battle to
legitimate narrative continues […] Despite a number of scholarly volumes now currently
available on narrative theory, the value of narrative research is frequently challenged” (14). Yet
Pagnucci, along with theorists such as Lad Tobin and Sondra Perl, has forcefully argued for the
value of narrative knowledge in the field of Composition Studies, and in academia as a whole.
Constructing this particular chapter in the first person allowed me to enact not only the kinds of
practices I encourage in my own classroom (thus further narrowing the gap between my own
writing/research practices and the writing/research practices of my students), but also to further
illustrate the insights I have gleaned from many of the women whose work I address in other
chapters—that the use of various genres and registers actively underscores the diverse and
context-specific ways in which meaning can be made. In this chapter I explore some of the ways
in which adopting a reparative reading approach has enabled me to better engage not only with
trauma-based student texts, but also to facilitate a richer environments for all students by opening
my perceptions of what constitutes an “appropriate” text for a writing class and by critically rethinking assignment design and assessment practices.
Threading these chapters together is the concept of the dialogic. Reading—like therapy;
like pedagogy—is ultimately a communal activity. I am deeply indebted to critical traditions that
privilege each of these acts as a dynamic and ethical interaction between two (or more) fully
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human subjects. From reader-response theory to Ferenczian psychoanalysis to expressivist
pedagogy, I have attempted to ground my understanding of traumatic representation and its
reception in a framework that recognizes both the irreducible singularity of the other, as well as
the necessity of finding ways to forge empathetic connections with those whose experiences may
differ dramatically from our own.
I focus on a variety of sites in this project—non-linear memoirs; the public discourse
around the trauma of rape; the courtroom; the classroom; the psychoanalytic session. In doing so,
I by no means wish to suggest a false equivalency between these arenas. What I do intend is
explore some of the responsibilities entrusted to various audiences engaging with trauma-based
narrative in multiple forms. Whether one is a casual reader, a member of a jury, a therapist, a
teacher, or a scholar, it is valuable to have insight into the ways in which those who present
trauma-based stories may call on us to actively engage with their narratives ethically and
empathetically. I ultimately hope to offer here some modes of textual relation informed by a
spirit of generosity and risk-taking, and engage in an exploration of the kinds of meaning that
may be made between subjects invested in speaking difficult truths, and those who are willing to
listen.

7
Chapter One
With Torn Ends Visible: Narrative, Revision, and the Unconsumeable Memoir

In her essay “When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-vision,” feminist poet and critic
Adrienne Rich famously asserts that “re-vision—the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh
eyes, of entering an old text from a new critical direction—is for us more than a chapter in
cultural history; it is an act of survival” (18). This insight—that the ability to radically re-see and
radically re-write the stories that shape our experiences is crucial to our ability to situate
ourselves in the world—is born out in the work of several twentieth century women memoirists
who challenge traditional paradigms of storytelling. It also has significance for the audiences of
such work, who must negotiate structures that refuse to conform to popular conceptions of the
ultimate coherence of memory, body, and narrative.
The consumption of memoir, especially among women, has sky-rocketed in the U.S.
since the 1990s. In “But Enough About Me,” Daniel Mendelsohn explores the reasons for the
growing popularity of memoir, arguing that the confessional memoir has functionally replaced the
novel for a public audience, writing that public “hunger for good stories at any price also suggests

that the trauma-and-redemption memoir, with its strong narrative trajectory and straightforward
themes, may be filling a gap created by the gradual displacement of the novel from its once
central position in literary culture.” Linking what he sees as an at times dogmatic demand for
veracity with the explosion of confessional Internet culture, Mendelsohn expresses concern that
the function of memoir as “art” has largely been ignored.
There are more serious critiques of the popularity of memoir than its contribution to the
supposed demise of ars gratia artis, however. While primarily arguing for the socially
transformative power of personal narrative, Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith also point out in
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Human Rights and Narrated Lives the ways in which the commodification of life experiences is
problematically connected to an insistence on particular types of narratives (what Mendelsohn
calls “trauma-and-redemption” narratives), reproducing “a circuit of demand in which the
powerful and relatively privileged retain the right to confer or refuse recognition” (232). In the
words of David Shields in Reality Hunger: A Manifesto, “What if America isn’t really the sort of
place where a street urchin can charm his way to the top through diligence and talent? What if
instead it’s the sort of place where heartwarming stories about abused children who triumphed
through adversity are made up and marketed?” (36).
Like Shields, I believe that “[m]emoir is a genre in need of an informed readership. It’s a
mistake to read a memoir as though the writer owes the reader the same record of literal accuracy
that is owed in newspaper reporting” (Shields 40). As critics like Jane Greer, Anne G. Bergin,
and Rona Kaufman suggest in Reading Sites: Social Difference and Reader Response, however,
it’s uncomfortably easy for academics to dismiss “trauma-and-redemption” memoirs and their
(predominantly female) audiences (Schweickart and Flynn). I want to be clear that my purpose
here does not include denigrating plot-driven memoirs or their audiences; instead I simply want
to acknowledge that their popularity speaks, by contrast, to the role of memoir that does not
follow traditional narrative patterns.
Memoirs of all sorts can provide both writer and reader with a means of situating
themselves in a difficult world. But the idea of “situation” is a tricky one, laden with
expectations. I think of a commercial for home ownership (put out by the National Association
of Realtors) I’ve seen recently, that tells us that homeownership leads to stronger communities
and higher self-esteem and academic performance for the children of homeowners. The circular
logic of such claims notwithstanding, the commercial appeals to the American success story in
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an obvious way—when we are “settled,” we are also “successful.” Memoirs can be “homes” of
a sort—places where we (both writer and reader) lay our desires; our experiences; our very
bodies. But, as Judith Halberstam points out in The Queer Art of Failure, narratives of success
are not always the most constructive models for those whose own bodies and experiences have
long born the mark of “failure” in a patriarchal culture. When particular narratives in which
success is often linked with tropes such as triumph over adversity and the reconstitution of the
“shattered self” (Glass) are consistently privileged, alternative desires (such as revenge,
forgetting, or unbecoming) are marginalized.
My focus here, then, is on the “unconsumeable” memoir—the memoir that, through
strategies of elision, recursivity, excess, repetition, substitution, and fragmentation, succeeds in
disrupting expectations of accessibility, of finding an unproblematized place to lay down one’s
head. Such strategies are particularly important for women memoirists, whose bodies are always
already connected to temporality in specific ways, tethered to scripts of innocence/maturity, pre
and post sexual intercourse (or rape), pre and post motherhood, etc. In such a linear context, we
may benefit from an encounter with what Elizabeth Grosz terms the “volatile” body—the body
that refuses to inscribe itself in static chronological terms1. Poet Wallace Stevens, in “Notes
Toward A Supreme Fiction,” writes: “From this the poem springs: that we live in a place/ That is
not our own, and much more, not ourselves/ And hard it is in spite of blazoned days.” Memoir, I
believe, springs from that same place. The writers I will be engaging with inhabit the space that
is “not their own” with an intense awareness of the difficulty of such a task. Rather than settling
into comforting and familiar patterns, they seek to find alternate modes of representation that
reflect the precariousness of situation, constructing what I call “provisional fictions”—stories

1

Although not all of the memoirs I will be exploring are explicitly trauma-based, many of them are; such strategies
are intrinsically, I would argue, linked to the production (and re-vision) of traumatic knowledge.
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that straddle spaces of knowing/not knowing; home/exile; memory/forgetting; stories that offer
sustenance and consolation without closure and correctness.
Drawing on the work of James C. Scott, Judith Halberstam challenges the privileging of
“legibility,” calling instead for forms that emphasize “mutuality, collectivity, plasticity, diversity,
and adaptability” (10). “Illegibility may in fact be one way of escaping […] political
manipulation” (10.) I think here of the ways in which women’s experience (specifically, though
not exclusively, traumatic experience), when codified in recognizable structures, can come to
reify, rather than resist, the kinds of narrative pressure created by institutions like the judicial
system (or Oprah’s Book Club). What might it mean to “un-write”? What might it mean to
forget, rather than memorialize, Shield’s “vertiginous details”?
Halberstam urges us to “suspect memorialization,” advocating for “certain forms of
erasure over memory precisely because memorialization has a tendency to tidy up disorderly
histories […] Memory is itself a disciplinary mechanism that Foucault calls ‘a ritual of power’; it
selects for what is important (the histories of triumph), it reads a continuous narrative into one
full of ruptures and contradictions” (15). In this context, “forgetting” can become “a way of
resisting the heroic and grand logics of recall and unleashes new forms of memory that relate
more to spectrality than to hard evidence, to lost genealogies than to inheritance, to erasure than
to inscription” (15). While never forgetting the potential power of remembering, I’m also drawn
to Halberstam’s insight that, “[f]or women and queer people, forgetfulness can be a useful tool
for jamming the smooth operations of the normal and the ordinary” (Halberstam 70).
The memoirs I will be exploring here cross boundaries; they unsettle tidy notions of truth
and fiction, memorialization and erasure. The selves and stories constructed in the texts of
women like Meena Alexander, Susan Brison, Sophie Calle, Anne Carson, Theresa Hak Kyung
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Cha, and Maxine Hong Kingston are at once anchors in reality and malleable, revisable creations
that refuse to conform to “trauma-and-redemption” plots. In essence, these women succeed in
exploding the genre of “memoir” and unearthing its inherent potential to be subversive, to call
into question our very ideas of what memory, the body, and truth telling can mean. What I am
offering here is a question: when we begin to value the concept of mosaic—the notion of
fractured experience reconfigured in a way that challenges static configurations of narrative and
temporality—how might we come to unsettle a popular understanding of the boundaries between
self and other; fiction and truth-telling; fragment and whole?

The Spaces in Between: Memoir as Collage
David Shields writes that:
In English, the term memoir comes directly from the French for memory,
mémoire, a word that is derived from the Latin for the same, memoria. And yet
more deeply rooted in the word memoir is a far less confident one. Embedded in
Latin’s memoria is the ancient Greek mérmeros, an offshoot of the Avestic
Persian mer-mara, itself a derivative of the Indo-European for that which we
think about but cannot grasp: mer-mer, “to vividly wonder,” “to be anxious,” to
“exhaustingly ponder.” In this darker light of human language, the term suggests
a literary form that is much less confident than today’s novelistic memoir, with its
effortlessly relayed experiences. (40-41)
If the trauma and redemption memoir, with its illusion of cohesiveness and wholeness, fails to
evoke these more uncertain modes of relation, we do find them in the work of women like Anne
Carson and Theresa Hak Kyung Cha—writers for whom “memoir” becomes a form of collage,
an opaque attempt at collection that deliberately thwarts the desire for mastery or conclusion.
Carson’s Nox is a haunting example of the collage-memoir. A reproduction of the
handmade book she constructed after the death of her brother (whom she hadn’t seen in years),
the accordion style text, housed in a sturdy cardboard box, functions as an elegy. Comprised of
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passages from historical texts; dictionary entries; letters; photos; paintings; transcribed dialogue;
poetry; and scraps of memory, the text uses the historian Herodotus as a frame. Herodotus,
Carson writes, teaches us that reading history is “a process of asking, searching, collecting,
doubting, striving, testing, blaming and above all standing amazed at the strange things humans
do” (Carson).
The desire for a center is evoked but continually displaced throughout the text: “We want
other people to have a centre, a history, an account that makes sense. We want to be able to say
This is what he did and Here’s why. It forms a lock against oblivion. Does it?” (Carson).
Carson’s brother’s long absence from her life is punctuated only occasionally by letters; it is up
to his widow to fill in (some) of the blanks in his narrative. Carson’s portrait of her brother, both
an act of mourning and a reflection on the inevitable incompleteness of the act, lacks the kind of
certainty typically associated with written history: “Autopsy is a term historians use of the
‘eyewitnessing’ of data or events by the historian himself, a mode of authorial power. To
withhold this authorization is also powerful” (Carson). The very absence of her brother, the
“center” of the text, speaks more powerfully than false attempts to re-create his presence: “I am
looking a long time into the muteness of my brother. It resists me. He refuses to be “cooked”
[…] in my transactional order” (Carson). Instead, Carson’s project becomes one of inquiry:
History and elegy are akin […] One who asks about things—about their
dimensions, weight, location, moods, names, holiness, smell—is an historian. But
the asking is not idle. It is when you are asking about something that you realize
you yourself have survived it, and so you must carry it, or fashion it into a thing
that carries itself. (Carson)
The thing that “carries itself” in this case becomes an artifact; Nox is at once a sturdy object—a
weighty memorialization that requires physical engagement—and a record of the unrecordable,
the ineffable:
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When my parents died I chose not to eat but to burn them. Then buried the ashes
under a stone cut with their names. For my brother I had no choice, I was a
thousand miles away. His widow says he wanted to be cast in the sea, so she did
this. There is no stone and as I say he changed his name. (Carson)
Elegy, like translation, is an imprecise act. Preoccupied with translating Catullus’s elegy for his
own brother, Carson comes to realize that such an attempt is ultimately enriching and consoling,
and ever incomplete: “I never arrived at the translation I would have liked to do of poem 101.
But over the years of working at it, I came to think of translating as a room, not exactly an
unknown room, where one gropes for the light switch. I guess it never ends. A brother never
ends. I prowl him. He does not end” (Carson).
The configuration of translating as a room—not exactly “unknown”, but one in which
one has to grow comfortable in the dark without ever fully feeling closure—evokes the
precariousness of situating one’s self—an act that is necessary though ultimately impossible. In
Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, Judith Butler writes: “I tell a story about
the relations I choose, only to expose, somewhere along the way, the way I am gripped and
undone by these very relations. My narrative falters, as it must” (Butler 23). It is in the act of
searching (and faltering) itself that Carson finds a home, both uncomfortable and open: “In one
sense it is a room I can never leave, perhaps dreadful for that. At the same time, a place
composed entirely of entries” (Carson). The dictionary entries she includes throughout the text in
an attempt to make sense of loss are also entries into multiple modes of being and relating: “The
law of mosaics: how to deal with parts in the absence of wholes” (Shields 113).
In the conclusion of his own collage-memoir that weaves the story of his mother’s
traumatic childhood with his idyllic one, writer Derek Owens intertwines their narratives against
the backdrop of the history of upstate New York through the use of quotes, narrative, poetry,
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documents, and photos. Owens, like Carson, troubles the notion of memoir as a genre of triumph
and closure:
while I agree […] with this understanding of memory as myth and as such
inevitably the stuff of history, there are moments when I look back at all this and
wonder, would it have been better simply to have not known. to have kept it all
buried. would that her ancient selves, and the memories they dragged in, had
remained deep inside. for the triumph of her account seems coupled too closely
with a mourning that in the end mocks the label triumph. and yet […] this dance
of return and excavation reveals some larger ineluctable pull, that weird impulse
to stretch the temporal like taffy, looking backwards with one eye while focusing
ahead into a present with another. Like the eyes of a chameleon, each one rotating
of its own accord, and magically, unnaturally, the two views re-assembled,
conjoined within their hybrid narrative. (Owens 145)

By highlighting the inevitable connection between triumph and mourning, Owens complicates a
facile understanding of the kind of “success story” more linear memoirs may veer towards. Yet
I’m also drawn to his insight that a recognition of the tension between memory and forgetting,
the whole and the part, does not preclude a possibility for hope, and for the construction of a sort
of “hybrid” text that recognizes multiple impulses.
It’s significant that Owens, early in his own project, invokes a question from perhaps the
most well-known contemporary collage-memoir, Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s Dictee: “Why
resurrect it all now” (qtd. in Owens 6). In Dictee, the use of mosaic becomes a means of
attempting to answer this question while simultaneously resisting the linear structuring of
memory and experience. Collage here becomes a powerful means of transcending binaries
between subject and object; history and present. A pastiche with no central narrative voice,
Dictee is composed of multiple voices, languages, and modes, and organized in relation to the
nine Greek Muses. Weaving together narrative with film stills, French translation exercises,
photos, letters, blank space, handwritten notes, and maps, Cha textually enacts the realization
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that “[c]ollage is a demonstration of the many becoming the one, with the one never fully
resolved because of the many that continue to impinge upon it” (Shields 112).
Patricia Yaeger, in her essay “Toward a Female Sublime,” writes that, “as a literary genre
or moment concerned with empowerment, transport, and the self’s strong sense of authority, the
sublime is a genre the woman writer needs” (192). Exploring various modes of “female
sublimity” achieved by writers from Eudora Welty to Elizabeth Bishop, Yaeger claims that the
“discovery of the sublime as a mode allowing trespass and appropriation of ‘forbidden and illicit
forces’ speaks to the woman writer at play—the woman writer who is looking for a genre
permitting the exploration of alternative modes of female experience” (Yaeger 199). I’m
especially intrigued by the ways in which Dictee enacts such “trespass”; the work of collage here
goes beyond deconstruction or cutting and pasting; it instead becomes a vehicle for
transcendence.
Theorized by psychoanalytic critics like Neil Hertz and Thomas Weiskel as a moment
when “a burden (of the past, but not exclusively) is lifted and there is an influx of power,”
(Weiskel 11), the “Romantic,” or oedipal, sublime is tied to classic distinctions between subject
and object; self and other. The individual (traditionally a male poet) encounters an overwhelming
power—something vast and “unknown”—that threatens to obliterate his ego. Faced with such a
threat, the psyche can either shatter, or it can reaffirm itself by incorporation. The task of the
Romantic poet is thus to find a language that is capable of “containing” the powerful object; he
struggles to re-constitute it through language. In this way, the power of the sublime encounter
transfers from the sublime object to the poet (and at times to his reader, whose own encounter
with the text may replicate this structure). A moment of identification and brilliance follows a
moment of incomprehension and blockage, subsuming difference in the process.
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In her own collection rootprints, French theorist and author Hélène Cixous offers a
language of transport that revisits and revises this oedipal notion of sublimity. She offers:
What interests me is what I do not know. And it leaves me first of all silent. It
strikes me with surprise, with a certain silence. But at the same time, it strikes my
body, it hurts me. I know that a search, or an exploration will unfold in this
direction. It is always what is stronger than I am that interests me…Does this
mean it is impossible for me to report it? No. Because we can always be stronger
than ourselves; we move forward […] [W]hen I first began writing […] I went
towards things that I did not know; I glimpsed dazzling scenes before me, where
what I do not know, what I do not understand begins. All of a sudden, it revealed
itself to me, absolutely, like in the Apocalypse. And then […] obviously, I was
jubilant—obscureness and thus weights in my life finally dissipated. As always in
these cases, for everyone, this gave me additional strength. (Cixous 73)
In this description, which evokes the traditional configuration of the sublime experience,
“interest” is provoked in the subject by an “other” which is “stronger.” The encounter is first
painful, but after a moment of blockage comes a moment of joyful revelation, followed by an
influx of power. Dictee begins with a similar evocation, where dissolution precedes utterance:
“Inside her voids. It does not contain further. Rising from the empty below, pebble lumps of gas.
Moisture. Begin to flood her. Dissolving her […] The delivery. She takes it. Slow. The invoking
[…] The utter” (5).
However, in an interesting twist on Shelley’s query at the end of “Mont Blanc,” the
classical locus of the Romantic sublime, “And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea,/If to
the human mind’s imaginings/Silence and solitude were vacancy?,” Cixous asserts that it is the
other who gives the subject richness:
The other in all his or her forms gives me I. It is on the occasion of the
other that I catch sight of me; or that I catch me at: reacting, choosing, refusing,
accepting. It is the other who makes my portrait. Always. And luckily. The other
of all sorts, is also of all diverse richness. The more the other is rich, the more I
am rich…This is what people do not know, in general, and it’s too bad. They are
scared of those they consider to be stronger or richer or bigger, without realizing
that the richer, the bigger, the stronger person enriches us, makes us bigger,
stronger.” (Cixous 13)
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The locus of the sublime shifts from the subject, although it likewise resists resting solely in the
object. Cixous instead locates the sublime experience in the moment of connection between
object and subject, where a transfer takes place. This transfer “enriches” the subject, whose
“portrait” is, in an ironic reversal of “Mont Blanc,” created by the “other” of the sublime
encounter. Cixous revises the power balance of the traditional sublime in which the “I” eclipses
all, asserting instead a flow of power that comes specifically from the subject’s recognition of the
infinite difference of the other in the sublime encounter, rather than the subject’s identification
with that object, which would minimize that difference.
Likewise, the fragmented structure of Dictee undoes the promise of stability inherent in
the self/other dichotomy of the traditional sublime: “Collage precisely references the spaces in
between and refuses to respect the boundaries that usually delineate self from other” (Halberstam
136). The proliferation of selves in the text is a process of expenditure that “spills whatever
power the sublime moment—in its structure of crisis, confrontation, and renewed domination—
has promised to hoard” (Yaeger 202). Dictee is ripe with such moments. Cha’s catalogue of veils
is one of the most marked:
Glass. Drape. Lace. Curtain. Blinds. Gauze. Veil. Viole. Voile de mariée. Voile
de religeuse Shade shelter shield shadow mist covert screen screen door screen
gate smoke screen concealment eye shade eye shield opaque silk gauze filter frost
(Cha 127)
In Josephine Nock-Hee Park’s “‘What of the Partition?’: Dictee’s Boundaries and the American
Epic,” she writes: “The sheer excess of this list, with its dazzling permutations of screens shows
us that the fragile border is in fact a site sturdy enough to withstand the complicated labor of
Cha’s text” (Park 234). “Excess”; “dazzling”: Park’s vocabulary is that of the sublime, but the
function of Cha’s “excess,” she suggests, is as a gesture of reassurance, and not dominance: the
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liminal, the border, becomes a place not of the anxiety of dissolution and instability, but a
“sturdy” site, capable of withstanding the work of the text and the immense weight of the unableto-be-spoken.
Park, ruminating on the ending of the nine-day mediation of Dictee—a young girl on the
verge of entering the house where her mother is waiting—asks: “Yet why does the ninth day end
here, at the threshhold?” (Park 213). Cixous writes that “mystery” and difference are often
repressed, “and it’s settled. But if on the contrary one remains open and susceptible to all the
phenomena of overflowing, beginning with natural phenomena, one discovers the immense
landscape of the trans-, of the passage” (52). This notion of the “trans-,” so crucial to the
sublime experience, is also crucial to the project undertaken in Dictee, a novel of boundaryblurring in which the author “allows others to occupy her” (Park 216). The language that Park
uses to describe Cha’s work is telling: the self of the text founds “its existence in transit, in the
fact of the flight and return” (Park 228); the text is marked by “confusion between subject and
object” (218); it evokes a “liminal” experience (218). Cha “reverses the one lost and the one
searching” (230). This language—of flight, transit, boundary confusion, reversal—reveals the
way in which the text enacts sublimity. After the initial blockage of “bared noise, groans, bits
torn from words” (Cha 3), Dictee goes on—often through gaps and silences—to enact what critic
Robert Dainotto calls “that ephemeral brilliant moment of writing the impossibility of writing”
(151).
“Loss and survival are two of the most remarkable traits of the sublime” (Dainatto 138),
and both are central to Dictee—the loss of the mother tongue (both symbolic and literal) is
followed by a dazzling series of connections and disruptions that leads to the writer’s realization
that “if she were able to write she could continue to live” (Cha 141). This realization is
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inextricably connected to the experiences of other women—Cha’s mother, revolutionary Yu
Guan Soon, Jeanne D’Arc, Demeter and Persephone—including powerful mythic females.
Dictee reaffirms the sacred, refusing to acknowledge the ostensible “used-up-ness” of the
transcendent sublime, while re-negotiating the oedipal relationship(s) between self and other that
mark the structure of Romantic sublimity.
Halberstam writes:
While the libido tends to ward off the death dive though a ‘will to power,’ a desire
for mastery, and an externalization of erotic energy, sometimes libidinal energies
are given over to destabilization, unbecoming, and unraveling. This is what Leo
Bersani refers to as ‘self-shattering,’ a shadowy sexual impulse that most people
would rather deny or sublimate. If taken seriously, unbecoming may have its
political equivalent in an anarchic refusal of coherence and proscriptive forms of
agency. (136)
Cha’s resistance to a central narrative structure allows her to enact such a sublime un-becoming.
Like Carson’s evocative and multi-faceted elegy for her brother, Cha’s polyvocal exploration of
memory, history, and loss hints at “the movement, the shimmering of the differing of a time and
space not yet configured, numerated, mastered, or occupied” (Grosz 111).

Perhaps One Has to Give it Up: Re-vision as Resistance in the Trauma-Based Memoir

Recalling Adrienne Rich’s equation of re-vision with survival, I turn now to the memoirs
of feminist women who textually enact the realization that “the act of looking back, of seeing
with fresh eyes […] is an act of survival.” In the works of Susan Brison, Meena Alexander, and
Maxine Hong Kingston, recalling the past becomes synonymous with re-writing the past: in the
words of Hélène Cixous in Stigmata, “Writing is the movement to return to where we haven’t
been ‘in person’ but only in wounded flesh” (97). It is through writing that the authors give shape
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to traumatic experience: “Trauma is not locatable in the simple violent or original event […] but
rather in the way that its very unassimilated nature—the way it was precisely not known in the
first instance—returns to haunt the survivor later on” (Caruth 4). A central question of the
memoirs at hand seems to be: “How does one remake a self from the scattered shards of
disrupted memory,” while at the same acknowledging “that the unitary self is an illusion and that
we are all composed of a series of successive selves”? (Brison 49). Engaging with the buried and
revisable histories of the memoirs here—texts that attempt to reconcile these impulses—the
reader is called to transgress the problematic boundaries between “fiction” and “truth-telling”
that haunt much contemporary discourse around narratives of trauma, while engaging with the
embodied experience of the writers.
Susan Brison’s Aftermath offers multiple accounts of her rape and attempted murder. It is
an act of sense and self-making as well as a philosophical inquiry into traumatic experience,
which Brison ultimately configures as a “surd,” or “non-sensical entry into the series of events of
one’s life, making it seem impossible to carry on with the series” (103). The book was composed
over a ten year period, and the chapters are recursive; later chapters reference and offer different
narratives than earlier chapters, though they all co-exist between the covers of the text, which
Brison describes as:
a record of my thinking about trauma and recovery over the past ten years. The
chronology of this period, however, is fractured in the telling. Time may be linear
(who knows?) but the aftermath was not. There have been many periods of
progress and of decline, victories and setbacks, both major and minor. I have
changed during this time and so have my views, but, rather than revise my earlier
writings in light of more recent understandings, I have tried to convey the
trajectory of my ideas. (Brison xi)

Resisting the urge to impose a false unity on her experience, Brison allows the tension between
“progress and decline, victories and setbacks” to play out throughout the memoir. In the words of
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Marcel Proust in The Fugitive (another text in which mourning as a linear process is constantly
disrupted by the physicality of memory): “As they recede, passing days gradually cover over
those which went before and are themselves buried by those that come after. But each past day
remains deposited within us as in some vast library where there are copies even of the oldest
books” (Proust 509).
Brison has recourse to various discourses (philosophy, memoir), temporal perspectives,
and affect registers as she explores the moment of the trauma itself and the subsequent processes
it demands, both internal (recovery process) and external (legal process). She engages with the
tension between the personal and the political functions of trauma narratives in an exceptionally
nuanced and insightful way. It is by “constructing and telling a narrative of the trauma endured,
and with the help of understanding listeners, [that] the survivor begins not only to integrate the
traumatic episode into a life with a before and after, but also to gain control over the occurrence
of intrusive memories” (71). However, clinging too tightly to one “correct” version of the trauma
narrative (as is required by the legal process, for instance, which I will discuss in Chapter Two),
may actually hinder recovery “by tethering the survivor to one rigid version of the past” (103).
Brison thus argues that “[a]fter gaining enough control over the story to be able to tell it, perhaps
one has to give it up, in order to retell it, without having to ‘get it right,’ without fear of betraying
it, to be able to rewrite the past in different ways, leading up to an infinite variety of
unforeseeable futures” (103). Brison enacts this discovery throughout the text, subverting closure
by refusing to rest on “the story” of her trauma, instead offering multiple ways of “making
sense” of the ultimately senseless.
Brison is told by those around her that she is “lucky”:
After I was rescued and taken to the Grenoble hospital, I was told repeatedly how
“lucky” I was to be alive, and for a short while I even believed this myself. At the
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time I did not yet know how trauma not only haunts the conscious and
unconscious mind, but also remains in the body, in each of the senses, ready to
resurface whenever something triggers a reliving of the traumatic event. I didn’t
know that the worst—the unimaginably painful aftermath of violence—was yet to
come. (Brison x)

Brison is haunted by the realization that memory disrupts the sort of trauma and redemption
memoir many writers (and audiences) may cling to: “The first few rape memoirs I read followed
the expected plot—a kind of reverse-conversion narrative,” she writes, “A perfectly good, intact
life was destroyed, then painstakingly pieced back together” (110). Her own narrative was, she
says, “initially, remarkably—uncannily—similar to what seemed to be becoming the standard
rape narrative. But it isn’t ending up that way” (111). Instead, Brison’s embodied experience
after the rape becomes one of rupture, fracture, surprise: “after things got better, they got worse”
(111). Joyful or traumatic events like the birth of her child; her brother’s suicide; the murder of
her friends cause the “graph of her recovery” to “oscillate” (112). Brison thus acknowledges that
her self-narrative is “constantly being revised, and is permanently revisable” (111).
In the end, there is survival. Recovery may not “consist of picking up the pieces of a
shattered self (or fractured narrative)”; instead, “it’s facing the fact that there never was a
coherent self (or story) there to begin with” (Brison 116). Yet such knowledge does not foreclose
on the possibilities of either agency or solace. Because, as Brison reminds us at the conclusion of
her book:
maybe recovery is reestablishing the illusory sense of the permanence of hope
[,…] resilience, the capacity to carry on, alive in the present, unbound by dread or
regret. Not the hard, flinty brittleness of rock, but the supple tenacity of the windrocked bough that bends, the bursting desire of a new-mown field that can’t wait
to grow back, the will to say, whatever comes, Let’s see what happens next” (116117).
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This promise of a provisional, tentative hope echoes Audre Lorde’s realization at the closing of
her own multi-faceted memoir The Cancer Journals: “I would never have chosen this path, but I
am very glad to be who I am, here” (77). Rather than engaging in the kind of “celebratory”
disintegration James Glass superficially associates with “postmodernism” in his (sometimes
frustratingly conservative, sometimes illuminating) Shattered Selves: Multiple Personality in a
Postmodern World, these writers realize that the construction and situation of a self is both a
necessary and ever-incomplete act. It is situated in a space where, in the words of Alice Sebold
(whose memoir I will explore in my next chapter), “hope is really springing out of something
that was—is—hard won, as opposed to purchased in the, you know, ‘hope to cope’ section at the
local bookstore.”
This uneasy reconciliation between the necessity and the precariousness of situation plays
itself out in Meena Alexander’s Fault Lines, which is, in the words of the writer, “writing in
search of a homeland” (3). Like Cha, who states, “if she were able to write she could continue to
live” (Cha 141), Alexander comes to the realization that “I must write if I am to go on living.
There is no other way” (Alexander 237). Alexander’s is a narrative that refuses to close in on
itself, instead proliferating; multiple places (“the fragments of a broken geography”), stories, and
languages become organized not through chronology and linearity, but around themes of
departure and return. “In America you have to explain yourself, constantly” (193). The text is
both an exploration of and a refusal to answer the questions: “Who are you? Where are you
from? What do you do?” (193).
Through meditation, poetry, evocation, myth, history, and photo, Alexander explores
desire and memory. Like Dictee, the text pushes the boundaries of genre, creating its own shape
and logic. It also becomes a philosophical examination of what language can do: attempt to make
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sense of violence; construct multiple and provisional identities and homelands; revise memory. It
explores “[a] life embedded in a life, and that in another life, another and another. Rooms within
rooms, each filled with its own scent: rosehips, neem leaves, dried hibiscus leaves that hold a
cure, cow dung, human excrement, dried gobs of blood” (Alexander 29). The physicality of
Alexander’s description speaks to a desire to inhabit space in a meaningful way, while at the
same time recognizing that the space of memory is not a singular “home,” but a series: “rooms
within rooms.” “What are you writing about?” a friend asks. “About being born in a female
body; about the difficulty of living in space,” Alexander replies. (3).
In the words of Elizabeth Grosz in Architecture From the Outside, “[b]uilding is not only
a movement of sedimentation and stabilization but also a way of opening space and living”
(Grosz 6). Resisting the “idea of building as a fixed entity or given stable object,” Grosz
advocates the notion of a building as “made up of other spaces within it that move and change,
even if its own walls remain fixed” (6). In her collection Poetics of Dislocation, Alexander
writes of a colleague who asks: “If you took the papers that you have all over your desk, […], if
you put them together and decided to make a house, what sort of house would it be?” (iv). “I
wouldn’t make a house,” she responds, “I would make a boat […] It would have to float […]
That’s essential. Though I could settle for a tent […] A floating tent. A tent for a poet who finds
it hard to be securely in place” (x). By configuring text as such a provisional structure—a place
of residence, though an uncertain, floating one—Alexander is able, in Fault Lines, to ask and reask the questions: “Who are we? What selves can we construct to live by? How shall we mark
out space? How shall we cross the street? How shall we live yet another day?” (Alexander 174).
“Write in fragments, the fragments will save you” (237). The “Book of Childhood,”
written after September 11, 2001, and ten years after the initial publication of Fault Lines, forces
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both writer and reader to complicate our relationship to the initial text. In light of the coda, which
excavates a buried memory of sexual abuse, the shape of the earlier text changes. Alexander
writes: “I had the gnawing feeling that under the story of multiple places, of a life lived between
languages and cultures, there was something more. That actual dislocation and exile, though true
as it was, had served me as an emotional counter for a darker truth, bitter exfoliation of self,
something that as yet I had no words for” (238). In his essay “William Wordsworth and Sigmund
Freud,” Patrick Hutton insightfully links Wordsworthian spots of time to Freudian screen
memories: unable to reveal the past accurately in and of themselves, these sites simultaneously
conceal the potentially shattering and act as “markers” by which we can access, through
psychoanalysis, these traumas. Like Alexander’s memories of dislocation and exile, screen
memories are real memories, although they conceal (and, sometimes, eventually reveal) deeper,
hidden traumas.
The simultaneously protective and revelatory potential of screen memories is linked to
the way in which the past can become present—an event necessary for the writer’s attempt to
make provisional meaning from the traumatic. Alexander’s account of the physical and uncertain
nature of traumatic memory is illuminating and intensely meaningful, both for the writer, who
can finally “absorb this difficult truth” (242), and for the reader, who is forced to recognize the
ultimate instability of both narrative and memory. The coda reveals but does not erase; the books
co-exist, side by side. In Suspiria de Profundis, Thomas De Quincey writes about the human
brain as a palimpsest, a “membrane or roll cleansed of its manuscript by reiterated successions”
(165). On such a membrane, new scripts can be inscribed over the old, but what is effaced
always leaves traces:
Such a palimpsest is my brain; such a palimpsest, O reader, is yours. Everlasting
layers of ideas, images, feelings have fallen upon your brain softly as light. Each
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succession has seemed to bury all that went before. And yet, in reality, not one
has been extinguished. (De Quincey 169)
Memory and forgetting are intertwined. The script of traumatic memory is “almost illegible”
(Alexander 289). In her poem “Illiterate Heart,” (dedicated to Adrienne Rich), Alexander writes:
“I cannot tease my writing hand around/ that burnt hole of sense, figure out the/ quickstep of
syllables.” Yet ultimately, Fault Lines ends with the recognition that the “work of art” provides
a “necessary translation”: “I think of it as a recasting that permits our lives to be given back to
us, fragile, precarious” (Alexander 289.)
Such a recasting, however, does not come “fluid and whole” (Alexander 2): “I have
written what I could through the rips and tears in the dress I once wore” (317). Resisting the
pressure to conform to a recognizable plotline, Fault Lines is a “book with torn ends visible” (3).
The reader, like the writer, of such a memoir must inhabit a space between certainty and doubt;
narrative and fragment—in other words, “a floating tent.”
The reader of Maxine Hong Kingston’s The Woman Warrior is also called upon to
inhabit a precarious space, one where the necessity of narrative competes with the transgressive
desires for multiplication and silence. The Woman Warrior is marked by the recognition that
“resistance” can be a fierce act of survival; that splitting and hiding can be creative and
constructive responses to trauma. The construction of an “alternate” self, for example, provides
Kingston with a site to work through her other childhood narrative: “My American life has been
such a disappointment” (45). Textually split, the stories in “White Tigers”—one of a ChineseAmerican girl, one of a Woman Warrior—are in dialogue with each other; two selves are
constructed. Voice comes more easily to the imagined self of the Woman Warrior. Literally
text—her parents carve “revenge” onto her back (34)—she also enacts the revenge of the
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Chinese-American self. When “one of [her] parents or the emigrant villagers” would say,
“Feeding girls is feeding cowbirds,” the childhood self “would thrash on the floor and scream so
hard [she] couldn’t talk” (46). Lacking the means to name and speak her rage, this self invokes
her other, the Woman Warrior. Showing her body-as-text to the baron who quotes her “the
sayings [she] hated”—“Girls are maggots in the rice...It is more profitable to raise geese than
daughters”—the Woman Warrior is able to claim, “You are responsible for this” (43). The
creation of the Woman Warrior—“rooted to the earth” (23)—is an act of preservation. “I was a
strange human being indeed—words carved on my back and the baby large in front” (40).
In Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History, Cathy Caruth uses the image
of “wound as voice” to underscore the crucial connections that exist among trauma, body, and
text (Caruth 2). The Woman Warrior, voicing the memory of past trauma through her scars,
embodies these links. She also embodies the naming and creative work of Kingston’s text as a
whole, providing a space for the childhood self to construct a nourishing narrative that exists
secretly, contemporaneous with her public silence. Rather than a “denial” of reality, the fiction of
the Woman Warrior is a necessary action—a means of crafting a provisional “home”—for a girl
attempting to situate herself in a hostile world.
In “A Song for a Barbarian Reed Pipe,” Kingston writes:
My silence was thickest—total—during the three years that I covered my school
paintings with black paint. I painted layers of black over houses and flowers and
suns, and when I drew on the blackboard, I put a layer of chalk on top. I was
making a stage curtain, and it was the moments before the curtain parted or rose
[...] I spread them out (so black and full of possibilities) and pretended the
curtains were swinging open, flying up, one after another, sunlight underneath,
mighty operas. (165)
Like the construction of the Woman Warrior, the painting of these hidden pictures, “full of
possibilities,” is a means of simultaneously creating and secretly safeguarding a self. School
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officials interpret the works as signs of a troubled psyche (165), but the function of the paintings
for the childhood self of The Woman Warrior is a protective one. In the words of Judith
Halberstam, such opaque strategies can be useful in challenging “the smooth operations of the
normal and the ordinary” (Halberstam 70). The reader of the “illegible” is forced to engage with
a discomfort that may ultimately prove rewarding for both artist and audience. As psychoanalyst
Michael Balint, who recognized the potential richness “veiled” by silence in the psychoanalytic
setting puts it in The Basic Fault: “Perhaps, if we can change our own approach from that of
considering [...] silence as a symptom of resistance to studying it as a possible source of
information, we may learn something” (Balint 27).
The possibilities of silence, however, exist alongside the liberating function of voice for
Kingston. The “recollection”—and thus, the working through—of trauma requires an excavation
of the hidden. Like the ghost of Kingston’s drowned aunt in “No Name Woman,” trauma can be
put to rest through remembering: “the real punishment was [...] the family’s deliberately
forgetting her” (16). In the blotting out, the erasure of existence, no transmission of knowledge
can take place, and repetition becomes unavoidable. Kingston’s task here is to “name the
unspeakable” (5). By “devoting pages of paper to her” (16), Kingston creates multiple identities
for the aunt whose very existence has been denied. These fictions allow her “forgotten” aunt to
survive in the pages of Kingston’s text. This act of fiction-making reflects the construction of
self-identity in the work, but also underscores the crucial role of the reader as witness: “The
reporting is the vengeance” (53).
Judith Butler writes:
Perhaps […] one mourns when one accepts that by the loss one undergoes one
will be changed, possibly forever. Perhaps mourning has to do with agreeing to
undergo a transformation […] the full result of which one cannot know in
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advance. There is losing, as we know, but there is also the transformative effect of
loss, and this latter cannot be charted or planned. (Butler 21)

Brison, Alexander, and Kingston each enact such a transformation through the act of writing, in
essence “speaking the unspeakable” while retaining a keen awareness that such a task, while
crucial to survival, is also necessarily without an end. For Proust, “our past, and the physical
lesions within whose lines it lies inscribed, determines our future” (Proust 471). Yet, as Brison
reminds us, both past and future are necessarily plural; it is the both the challenge and the
privilege of the memoirist “to be able to rewrite the past in different ways, leading up to an
infinite variety of unforeseeable futures” (103).

I Decided To Continue Such Exchanges: Sophie Calle and the Collaborative Memoir
In the hands of French artist, photographer, and performer Sophie Calle, memoir
becomes an explicitly dialogic endeavor. In texts such as Exquisite Pain, Take Care of Yourself,
Appointment With Sigmund Freud, and Suite vénitienne, Calle’s own experiences intertwine with
the experiences of others through image and text. Like some of her other well-known pieces
(such as The Sleepers and Double Game), these “auto-fictions” (Macel 21) are dependent on the
cooperation, conversation, and collaboration of others: “She turns onlookers into accomplices to
her privacy, and leaves them no way out” (Pacquement 15).
At the center of both Exquisite Pain and Take Care of Yourself is a psychic wound
resulting from the end of a love affair. Each text enacts a meticulous and obsessive dissection of
the break-up, using multiple voices to “exhaust” the moment of rupture. Exquisite Pain is
structured in two parts. The first, a countdown from the day that Calle leaves France for a 3
month trip to Japan to the day that her lover does not keep his promised meeting with her at a
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New Delhi hotel, calls attention to the way that narrative and memory are created
retrospectively; the “story” of a “break-up” is only available in hindsight. The second,
constructed as ninety nine pairs of stories—ninety-nine versions of her own break-up side by
side with the stories of suffering of ninety-nine friends and strangers—emphasizes the ways in
which experiences come to mean in dialogue with the experiences of others. Calle writes: “I
decided to continue such exchanges until I had got over my pain by comparing it with other
people’s, or had worn out my own story through sheer repetition.” The 99th time Calle “tells”
her story, the page is blank.
As Alfred Pacquement writes in his Preface to Calle’s collection M’AS TU VUE, “Sophie
Calle has not simply exhibited herself […] She is also fond of getting other people to do the
talking” (15). Like Exquisite Pain, Take Care of Yourself begins with the end of a love affair: “I
received an e-mail telling me it was over.” In response, Calle asks “one hundred and seven
women […] chosen for their profession or skills, to interpret this letter. To analyze it, comment
on it, dance it, sing it. Dissect it. Exhaust it. Understand it for me.” The responses—ranging
from crossword puzzle to fable to psychological analysis to puppet show—comprise the text,
exhaustively making sense of the letter in multiple—at times overlapping, at times divergent—
ways. Meaning-making is a collaborative act; it is the task of other women to “make sense” of
the letter to which Calle doesn’t “know how to respond.” “It was almost," she writes, “as if it
hadn’t been meant for me.” The letter ends “Take care of yourself.” By asking other women to
“answer for her,” Calle attempts to do just that; the book becomes a space to work through the
painful letter in the presence of not only sympathetic, but also active and interpretive, witnesses.
Both Exquisite Pain and Take Care of Yourself push the boundaries of “memoir” in
provocative and compelling ways. Calle subverts a desire for linearity by insistently zeroing in
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on the same moment dozens of times from dozens of angles while obsessively seeking closure.
Each text is a dialogic performance, a way of making sense of pain through narrative excess,
play, repetition, and the voices, expertise, and experience of others. The reader must approach
the central moment of each text anew dozens of times; any expectation of a singular, cohesive
narrative is disrupted as an array of other voices—all of which circle the central event of the
memoir; none of which exhaust it—proliferate.
The physical presence of the other is central in Calle’s oeuvre; in Appointment with
Sigmund Freud, a collection of photographs in dialogue with sparse text, Calle records her 1998
installation in Freud’s London home. By placing her own body and objects in dialogue with the
objects of Freud, Calle forces an excavation not only of her own subconscious (the roots of the
repetition complexes she explores through her installation), but of the submerged meanings
behind Freud’s own landscape of totems and books. Calle’s play on the idea of an “appointment”
with the father of psychoanalysis creates a forced (and gendered) intimacy between the two:
Sophie’s collection of personal keepsakes are her memory triggers, and they seem
naturally to cohabit Freud’s essentially masculine domain. Presented with 30
concise narratives printed on feminine pink cards, they entered into an immediate
dialogue with the psychoanalyst’s powerful aura. (Putnam 155)

This play with gender reversal and intimacy also realizes itself in Suite vénitienne, an account of
Calle’s following a man to (and through) Venice and secretly photographing him while trailing
him in disguise. Bound with Jean Baudrillard’s Please follow me, a reflection on Calle’s act of
photographic “seduction,” Suite vénitienne undoes the promise of plot fulfillment found in the
more conventional memoir or photo essay: “I will not go farther. He moves away, I lose sight of
him. After these last thirteen days with him, our story comes to a close […] I stop following
Henri B” (72). Baudrillard’s post-script to Calle’s text ends with the command, “Please follow

32
me” (86), a phrase which recursively circles back to the beginning of Calle’s own project, reaffirming the dialogic relationship between the texts.
As Halberstam writes, “We can […] recognize failure as a way of refusing to acquiesce
to dominant logics of power and discipline and as a form of critique” (Halberstam 88). In the
work of Calle, the logic of “failure” and “success” collapses on itself. It is through a meticulous
process of insistently following—and ultimately losing—the object at hand that Calle enacts her
own brand of collaborative self-making, “stage directing herself through words and photographic
imagery” (Paquement 15), yet always aware that, in the words of Cixous, “It is on the occasion
of the other that I catch sight of me; or that I catch me at: reacting, choosing, refusing, accepting.
It is the other who makes my portrait” (13).
*
In her introduction to the “memoir/anti-memoir” edition of literary journal CHAIN, guest
editor Kerry Sherin reflects on her encounter with:
work that seemed to address the motives of memoir without bowing to its generic
conventions or ideological assumptions [….] There were poets whose work was
autobiographical yet defied confessionalism’s ahistorical identifications, its
solipsism. There were prose writers whose memoirs took as their subjects the
constructedness of the selves. There were writers whose work addressed their own
political and social minority and the ways that representing the self can both
articulate and challenge one’s inscription into a marginal position. (Sherin)

My own impetus for this chapter was a similar interest in such texts; I am moved by the idea of
“memoir as re-invention, as generic interplay, as a conversation among texts, as travel back and
forth across times and states of mind” (Sherin). When grappling with memoirs that refuse to
perform coherent subjectivity and linear plots, we as an audience are called to re-examine our
own embodied reality; our relationships to memory and narrative structure, in productive and
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unsettling ways. We are forced to confront “the political and psychic stakes involved in selfrepresentation and the ongoing negotiations of subjects” (Sherin).
Perhaps this is especially true when the bodies and experiences inscribed are gendered
female. By resisting patriarchal history, passive modes of being, and culturally accepted mottoes
such as “whatever doesn’t kill you makes you stronger,” the women whose texts I engage with
here remind us of alternative ways of organizing our experiences in a world that is often hostile
to our agency, our desires, and our very lives. The memoirs surveyed here stand as a powerful
reminder that, in the words of Grosz in Architecture From The Outside:
The production of alternative models, registers, alignments, interrelations,
perspectives, and corporealities themselves, is what, among other things, is at
stake in feminist theory and in the arts: how to produce and insist on the cultural
and libidinal space for women’s bodies to take their place in a universal up to now
dominated by men; how to produce new spaces as/for women; how to make
knowledges and technologies work for women rather than simply reproduce
themselves according to men’s representations of women. (Grosz 46)
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Chapter Two

You Have to Confess: Rape and The Politics of Storytelling

And so, when the time comes, you have to turn to him,
the maniac's sperm still greasing your thighs,
your mind whirling like crazy. You have to confess
to him, you are guilty of the crime
of having been forced.
—Adrienne Rich
In her groundbreaking book Trauma and Recovery, Judith Herman establishes that the
relationship between trauma and storytelling is rarely a linear one. She urges both trauma victims
and those working with them of the danger of a “premature demand for certainty,” cautioning
that “[z]ealous conviction can all too easily replace on open, inquiring attitude” (180). While
being able to make sense of traumatic experience is crucial to the recovery process, the kind of
pressure discussed by Susan Brison in Aftermath for rape survivors to tell one cohesive story can
have detrimental effects. Rape victims who choose to make their stories public and/or seek
redress from the justice system, however, will indeed find themselves under intense pressure to
tell clear, concise, and coherent accounts of the violence they have undergone.
In Human Rights and Narrated Lives, Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith point out some of
the ways in which the single-minded demands of legal and political power structures may
negatively impact trauma survivors struggling to have their complex stories be heard. In their
effort to explore both the risks and the possibilities for transformation embodied in trauma
narratives, Schaeffer and Smith track the multiple and overlapping purposes served by stories
constructed around particular collective traumas (i.e., apartheid in South Africa; the forcible
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removal of indigenous children from their parents in Australia; the forced sexual slavery of
Korean women by the Japanese government during World War II; the unethical treatment of
U.S. prisoners; and the experiences of victims and witnesses of the Tiananmen Square massacre
in China.) They write: “Principally, this book is a testimony to the efficacy of stories: stories
silenced by and emerging from fear, shame, trauma, and repression; stories enlivened by hope,
connection, commitment, and affiliation; stories fed by calls for justice, fueled by empathy and
an ethics of equality and human dignity” (223). While they cite such stories and the human rights
campaigns that sustain and employ them to promote social change as “the most viable hope for
extending democracy, social justice, and freedom” (234), they also critique the way these
narratives may be re-purposed when put in the service of larger human rights campaigns. A
significant example of this kind of rhetorical “altering” occurred at the Truth and Reconciliation
Hearings in South Africa, in which many witnesses who testified saw their stories acting as a
vehicle for social change even as they were flattened to fit into a pre-existing schema of victim
forgiving oppressor. The multiplicity of other, more complex emotions and desires that might
inspire and become embodied in trauma narratives (e.g., hatred; desire for revenge; despair;
confusion) can be discouraged in a context in which the search for one cohesive narrative is
privileged.
In this chapter, I look at rape as both a personal and a collective trauma, one in which the
type of linear, cohesive narrative privileged by the legal system has particularly harmful effects
on both victims of rape and culture as a whole. In light of Schaffer and Smith’s argument, Susan
Brison’s claim that rape survivors may ultimately have to “give [their story] up, in order to retell
it, without having to ‘get it right,’ without fear of betraying it, to be able to rewrite the past”
(103), is compelling. The average rape victim “gives her account of the crime 57 times to various
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officials before the case even lands in court” (Goldman). These accounts will be combed over for
inconsistencies by police, lawyers, and often, if the stories become publicized, random members
of the general public. Evidence that the victim’s narrative has been anything less than
scrupulously consistent may lead to the outright dismissal of her claims. As Andrew E. Taslitz
writes in Rape and the Culture of the Courtroom, his critical examination of the judicial system
and the rhetoric of gender and rape, “With rape, the victim’s truthfulness is almost always
challenged” (Taslitz 6).
Coming forward with a narrative of rape is never easy. The public response to recent
cases such as the 2011 gang rape of an 11 year old girl by 20 men in Cleveland Texas attests to a
recent resurgence of victim-blaming in even the most cut and dry cases. In this particular
instance, for example, numerous reporters cited community members who insisted the rape was
the fault of the girl, who “dressed older than her age” (McKinley). In the “court of public
opinion,” as well as the actual legal system, the onus is often not on the rapist, but on the rape
victim to maintain her “innocence” by rigidly adhering to gendered societal scripts about what
constitutes appropriate appearance and behavior for women who aren’t “asking” for rape. In the
words of Andrea Dworkin, when it comes to acts of gendered violence such as rape, all too often
“[t]he tellers and the stories are ignored or ridiculed, threatened back into silence or destroyed,
and the experience of female suffering is buried in cultural invisibility and contempt” (20).
Women who wish to make their stories of violation and abuse public are often met with retraumatizing reactions such as blame and doubt, rather than empathy and belief.
Alice Sebold, in Lucky, chronicles her own experience as a rape survivor. Violently
attacked by a stranger while walking across her campus one night, she expresses frustration with
the reactions of those around her, from her family and neighbors who cannot bring themselves to
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use the word “rape” to the therapist who jokes, “Well, I guess this will make you less inhibited
about sex now, huh?” (77). From the start, the knowledge that she is expected to perform in
“acceptable” ways is incumbent on her. When she is encouraged to write about her experience by
a poetry professor, her violent poem—in which she expresses a desire for revenge upon her
rapist—is met with silence and dismay by her classmates. “You don’t really feel that way do
you?” asks a male classmate (100). It becomes obvious that her narrative deviates in important
ways from the scripts of guilt, silence, forgetting, and forgiveness often forced upon female
victims of sexual violence.
Sebold’s encounter with police officials after her violent attack also underscores the fact
that rape victims are expected to perform in particular ways if they wish to be believed. She
offers a potent example of how the “truth/lie” binary that informs the scrutiny of women’s rape
narratives operates in an investigative context. Discussing an encounter with the police officer
with whom she filed her initial report, she writes:
“Listen,” he said. He began to fumble out an apology. He said he was sorry if he
hadn’t seemed very nice back in May. “You get a lot of rape cases,” he said.
most of them never get this far. I’m pulling for you.” […] Fifteen years later,
when doing research for this book, I would find sentences he had written in the
original paperwork[…] “It is this writer’s opinion, after interview of the victim,
that this case, as presented by the victim, is not completely factual […] [I]t is
suggested that this case be referred to the inactive file.” […] For Lorenz, virgins
were not a part of his world. He was skeptical of many of the things I said. Later,
when the serology reports proved that what I had said was not a lie, that I had
been a virgin, and that I was telling the truth, he could not respect me enough.
(Sebold 144-145)
Lorenz’s initial response to the evidence of a college student who had just been brutally raped is
skepticism. It is only when her “virginity” is “proven” that the officer is free to “respect” the
young woman, who now inhabits the realm of “perfect victim.” Sebold’s own narrative tells the
story of a woman who convinces those around her of the veracity of her experience by molding it
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to the expectations of both the judicial system and a larger social insistence that only “good
girls” make sympathetic rape victims2.
Navigating such a hostile system effectively requires knowledge of its tropes. Sebold
appears in court with the awareness that she “represented an eighteen year old virgin co-ed. I was
dressed in red, white, and blue” (172). In order to be successful in court, the rape victim must
embody her own powerlessness. In Volatile Bodies, Elizabeth Grosz writes that the term “body
language is a not inappropriate description of the ways in which culturally specific grids of
power, regulation, and force condition and provide techniques for the formation of particular
bodies” (142). The bodies and comportment of rape victims are scrutinized in often unconscious
ways by police officers and jurors. In Sebold’s case, she strives to balance the appearance and
behavior she imagines conform to culturally sanctioned conceptions of femininity and virginity
with the kind of certainty and assertiveness that tend to mark witnesses as “truthful” in the eyes
of those who may not understand the ways that traumatic experience can affect normal
storytelling habits.
Feminist scholar Jennifer Griffiths writes that testimony “offers a public enactment of
memory, and clearly, the cultural context and content work collaboratively to shape testimony”
(Griffiths 5). Sebold’s testimony is a virtuoso performance, one that springs from her certitude
that any story that veers too far from cultural expectations of coherence and blamelessness will
be perceived as suspect:
On television and in the movies, the lawyer often says to to the victim before they
take the stand, ‘Just tell the truth.’ What it was left up to me to figure out was that
if you do that and nothing else, you lose. So I told them I was stupid, that I
shouldn’t have walked through the park. I said I intended to do something to
warn girls at the university about the park. And I was so good, so willing to
accept blame, that I hoped to be judged innocent by them. (Sebold 144)
2

And this when the rape is a “violent” one at the hands of a stranger—as Brownmiller reminds us, “[d]ate rapes
look especially bad for the victim in court, if they ever get to court, nor do they look good on paper” (257).
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In the powerful words of Adrienne Rich, the rape victim is “guilty of the crime of having been
forced.” To take the stand against one’s rapist is a difficult prospect; to be believed Sebold is
compelled to parrot victim-blaming rhetoric, and is thus also forced to re-inscribe common
myths about rape.
There is also intense pressure to present a cohesive tale where one may not exist: “[T]he
story of a case must be told in such a way to satisfy a jury’s need for narrative coherence and
fidelity” (Taslitz 15). The concept of “truth” in the courtroom setting is problematized for the
rape victim because of “the intense linguistic trauma wrought by the present system and the
immense failure of adversarial ‘truth-finding’ assumptions in rape cases” (Taslitz 120). Sebold
writes about beginning her testimony: “It was a shaky start to the most important story I would
ever tell. I began a sentence only to trail off and begin again. And this wasn’t because I was
unaware exactly what happened in the tunnel. It was saying the words out loud, knowing that it
was how I said them that could win or lose the case” (174). The nature of the legal system puts
pressure on witnesses to perform perfectly, especially in the face of cross-examination. While the
stereotypes that many people hold about rape and victims already put rape victims at a
disadvantage during trial, Taslitz points out that “[p]atriarchal stories are not the whole problem
[…] Another barrier stands in the way of a fair rape trial: the adversary system itself. That
system is based on competition. It assumes that a battle between warring adversaries will yield
truth” (Taslitz 9). The masculinist notion that truthful stories emerge from combative argument is
a further impediment faced by rape victims who wish to be believed. In the context of an
adversarial courtroom, victims lose control over the shape and presentation of their narratives.
Sebold echoes this knowledge when she writes about the defense attorney in the case: “I
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reentered the courtroom and took the stand. […] In front of me was my enemy. He would do
everything he could to make me look bad—stupid, confused, hysterical” (180). Indeed, “[a]we,
intimidation, and adversariness; reliving rape trauma; and lawyer domination of language are a
combination well designed to silence victim voices” (Taslitz 99). Sebold is understandably filled
with relief when the court bailiff tells her after testifying that she is “the best rape witness I’ve
ever seen on the stand” (198). This particular narrative performance was marked a “success” in
the eyes of the legal system.
Yet Sebold’s desire, throughout her memoir, to place this story in a larger cultural context
is marked. In the context of rape culture—signified for Sebold by a crude drawing in the elevator
of her sister’s dormitory at Penn State of a fraternity gang-rape victim, as well as the later rape of
her room-mate—Sebold’s story is one of many. In the interview published at the end of Lucky,
she says that one of her motivations for writing the book was “the desire to just put it out there
on the table, ‘This is what rape can look like.’ If people maybe know more about it, then the
victim’s not as alienated” (5). Her particular narrative becomes not only a way for her to make
sense of her own experience, but also to situate in a larger framework, and serve a larger goal.
Memoirs of sexual assault become a different kind of evidence than courtroom testimony. They
allow victims to regain control of their experience and explore the complex truths of rape
without altering their narratives to fit seamlessly into culturally-sanctioned ones. Additionally,
such texts shed light on the backdrop of sexual violence against which women live their lives,
and serve as invitations to their audiences to begin to re-think rape and its effects simply by the
act of listening. In the words of Susan Brison, “perhaps there is a psychological imperative,
analogous to the legal imperative, to keep telling one’s story until it is heard” (110).
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Brison’s Aftermath also invites readers to grapple with the complexity of engaging with
rape, both for the victim and those who hear her story. Like Sebold, Brison acknowledges the
widespread pressure to be a “perfect” victim: “Since I was assaulted by a stranger, in a ‘safe’
place, and was so visibly injured when I encountered the police and medical personnel, I was
[…] spared the insult, suffered by so many rape victims, of not being believed or of being said to
have asked for the attack” (Brison 7). Yet she also points out that even in her case, her assailant
claimed she had “provoked” the attack, and the police officer who took her report was quick to
add the phrase “Comme je suis sportive” (“Since I am athletic”) to explain why she was taking a
walk on the morning of the rape (7). Simple physical desires such as the urge to exercise on a
beautiful day must be appropriately subsumed into airtight narratives of acceptable female
behavior in order to ensure the “innocence” of rape victims. Brison’s injured body is further
scrutinized by two male doctors: “For about an hour the two of them went over me like a piece
of meat, calling out measurements of bruises and other assessments of damage, as if they were
performing an autopsy” (8). Such dehumanizing treatment underscores the ways in which the
very bodies of rape victims become public property, subject to analysis by those searching for
evidence of the reality of the violent assault that victims are forced to describe multiple times to
multiple audiences.
In her book Telling: A Memoir of Rape and Recovery, Patricia Weaver Francisco
intertwines the story of her own violent rape with fairy tales, the work of poets and trauma
theorists, and other women’s experiences with rape and anti-rape activism. Although her own
experience with police investigators is largely positive, Francisco also explores the ways in
which the legal and medical processes connected to rape cannot help but further de-humanize
victims. She describes her own experience in the hospital after her assault: “[A] man comes in
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with a camera, explaining that he needs to take photographs of my wounds for evidence. He is
perfectly respectful and quiet about this, but it requires that he label each cut with a small white
card lettered with my name and a number. As he props these cards next to my arm, neck, face,
hand, and methodically photographs each, I feel myself disappearing” (44). Like Brison, her
body literally becomes evidence as both it and her individual experience are subsumed into the
larger “justice” system. She writes that “for soldiers returning from war, we have medals,
monuments, and public ceremonies of memorial. With rape, the criminal justice system functions
as the formal arena for recognition and restitution, and has largely failed at both” (58). Although
the man who raped Francisco is never caught, she details her experience watching the trial of
another serial rapist as a sort of proxy for the trial she never experiences herself. This particular
trial, in which multiple victims were brutally attacked by a stranger while in their homes, leads to
a “guilty” verdict.” Yet even when the legal system is successful in prosecuting rapists,
Francisco implies, there may be other equally meaningful ways for victims to experience closure.
Like many other women who write about rape, Francisco explores the complex
relationship between trauma and storytelling: “At first, I could not stop telling the story of the
night a stranger raped me. I told it obsessively, sequentially, each detail rigidly in place” (10).
While Brison focuses on the feeling of “unclenching” that comes after the “obsessive” story is
told in a courtroom setting, Francisco also looks to the ways in which, absent of that particular
context, victims of rape may relinquish the need for such rigid storytelling practices. Her own
rape has multiple effects—it is ultimately responsible for her divorce, as well as her engagement
with feminist critique of popular culture (117). Yet the realization that she finds most profound is
that telling stories of rape can connect women in activist, as well as therapeutic, alliances.
Francisco joins a feminist activist group in Minnesota who design an art project, entitled “Silent
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Witnesses,” to draw attention to domestic violence. The project consists of “twenty-six life-size
wooden figures representing the Minnesota women killed in domestic violence in 1990 […] The
genius of the Witnesses’ design is the fact that they take up space. It’s been said that this is art’s
function, ‘to make the invisible visible’” (202). By using both their own bodies and the bodies of
the women represented in the sculpture to purposefully occupy public space, the activists refuse
to inhabit the realm of invisibility that has been designated for them. The presence of their bodies
disrupts the notion that violence against women is something that can be repressed or hidden in
the “private” sphere. Further, by connecting these figures with stories of the murdered women
and participating in rallies for domestic violence legislation outside the state capital, Francisco
and the activists she works with highlight the ways in which body, art, and community all play a
role in enacting larger social change.
Such activism may, Francisco suggests, ultimately have an impact on what Brison calls
the “widespread emotion illiteracy” (12) with regard to rape that compels people Brison is close
with to either choose not to respond to her rape at all, or to offer clichés such as “what doesn’t
kill you makes you stronger.” As Brison points out in her introduction, “[t]he prevalent lack of
empathy with trauma victims, which is reinforced by the cultural repression of memories of
violence and victimization […] results […] not merely from ignorance or indifference, but also
from an active fear of identifying with those whose terrifying fate forces us to acknowledge that
we are not in control of our own” (Brison x). This fear may partially explain the brutal doubts
with which stories of rape are often countered. The “unthinkable” realization that any woman, at
any time, might become the victim of a life-changing physical and psychological violation
merely by virtue of being3 is a harder pill to swallow for some than the comforting notion that we
3

I focus on female rape victims here because, as Cahill points out, “[m]en’s and women’s bodies are accorded
radically different social significance, subject to radically different discourses, and presented with radically different
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can protect ourselves by behaving in a certain prescribed way—walking with a “buddy”; wearing
less “revealing” clothes. The idea that we can never be fully in control of our bodies and destiny
is a frightening prospect that may make many uncomfortable.
But it is precisely this discomfort we must inhabit if we are ever to make sense of the
narratives of women who have been raped. Judith Butler’s query in Precarious Lives, “What is
real? Whose lives are real? […] What [..] is the relation between violence and those lives
considered as ‘unreal’?” (Butler 33) is pivotal if we are to meaningfully challenge a paradigm in
which the lived experience of many survivors is discounted because it does not fit a certain,
culturally sanctioned narrative. Only by understanding our encounter with the story of any rape
victim as an interaction between two subjects can we begin to undo the violence of questions
such as “What was she wearing?” As Cathy Caruth reminds us, “[t]he problem of witnessing
trauma […] is learning the difficult task of speaking the trauma in the terms offered by the
survivor” (Caruth 117). This is especially true when those terms do not fit our pre-existing
schemas.
In Trauma and Recovery, Judith Herman focuses on the impact of trauma and the ways in
which survivors can make sense of their experiences, putting special emphasis on the role of
witness: “[T]he [rape] survivor needs the help of others who are willing to recognize that a
traumatic event has occurred, to suspend their preconceived judgments, and simply bear witness
to her tale” (Herman 68). While Herman focuses primarily on the psychotherapeutic relationship,
many of her insights into the narrative and recovery processes following rape are instructive for
multiple audiences, including the reader who wishes to ethically cultivate a relationship to a
demands […] Class, race, sexual orientation: these axes also distinguish bodies and produce different bodily
experiences; therefore, those axes produce differences in the experience of rape and the threat of rape. By
understanding the role of the body in sexual and social politics, we will gain a clearer understanding of rape as a
bodily assault that is a disproportionate threat to women” (48-49)
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narrative born from the violation of an embodied subject. Although it would be both
irresponsible and philosophically suspect to suggest any sort of one to one correspondence
between reader and therapist (or, as I will discuss later, teacher), there is nonetheless a way in
which the knowledges of these distinct but connected positions can inform each other. In contrast
to the recurring character of the police investigator invoked by Sebold in Lucky, Herman cites
that “the therapist has to remember that she is not a fact-finder and that the reconstruction of the
trauma story is not a criminal investigation. Her role is to be an open-minded, compassionate
witness, not a detective” (Herman 180). Adopting a similar position when we encounter rape
narratives in the public sphere functions not only as an act of empathy, but an act with deep
political resonance in a culture where, as I have indicated earlier, the blaming and doubt of rape
victims has become something of a national pastime.

Did He Have a Gun?: L’Affaire DSK and Rape Discourse in the Public Sphere
On May 14, 2011, Nassifatou Diallo, a member of the housekeeping staff at Manhattan’s
Sofitel Hotel, reported a sexual assault by International Monetary Fund head Dominique StraussKahn. Almost immediately, her account was called into question in print by men such as
prominent French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy and conservative economist Ben Stein, who
wrote: “The prosecutors say that Mr. Strauss-Kahn ‘forced’ the complainant to have oral and
other sex with him. How? Did he have a gun? Did he have a knife? […] [I]f he was so
intimidating, why did she immediately feel un-intimidated enough to alert the authorities as to
her story?”
In her seminal text Against Our Will, Susan Brownmiller asserts that there is “a provable
bias by police and juries against the word of the female victim […] particularly the word of a
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black female victim” (Brownmiller 175). In the case of Diallo, this doubt was compounded by
her position as an immigrant, the rumors of news outlets like the New York Post (which ran an
unsubstantiated story calling Diallo a “hooker”), and the fact that her alleged assailant was a
powerful man. After reports of Diallo’s immigration status and connection with an incarcerated
man were released, there was a noticeable shift in the way the public received and consumed her
story. Rather than being (if it ever was) a rape narrative, the alleged attack became a moving
target for a variety of competing voices invested in exposing “class warfare” or a “broken
immigration system”; a warning tale for powerful men about vindictive, economically
disadvantaged women who will attempt to ruin their careers by crying sexual assault. Although,
as Judith Herman points out in Trauma and Recovery, “[i]n the course of reconstruction, the
story [of the survivor of rape] may change as missing pieces are recovered” (180), shifts in
Diallo’s chronology of events are attributed not to trauma, but to the fact that she is a “liar.”
(The fact that Strauss-Kahn’s own story had also morphed quite frequently did not seem to
matter.)
We, the “public,” received Diallo’s account through a myriad of competing prisms as
articles with titles such as “Strauss-Kahn's accuser: Schemer or immigrant survivor?” (Trotta)
proliferated. While high profile rape cases like these may indeed speak to larger concerns about
economic inequality or differences in judicial processes, what I found myself longing for amidst
the swirl of metaphors and accusations were accounts of the irreducible singularity of the
victim’s experience. Presented to us through various lenses fashioned by competing desires,
Diallo is emptied of identity by both detractors and “supporters.” Although his intent was
different than that of Lévy and Stein, for example, comedian Jon Stewart engaged in a similar
rhetorical erasure of Diallo’s individuality by referring to Diallo as “an African” in his attempt to
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link her interaction with Strauss-Kahn to the IMF’s economic dealings in third world countries.
Only by putting overlapping narratives—the narrative of the victim against the larger
backdrop of the climate in which such violation occurs—in dialogue with one another can we
ever hope to come to an understanding of the complex politics surrounding rape and its telling.
While there are multiple narratives for public consumption in this particular case—attractive
stories of power, wealth, and truth-telling, for example—there are also the (non-metaphorical)
narratives told by Diallo herself. The import of fostering widespread societal empathy for victims
of sexual assault begins with the realization that their stories must be heard within the framework
of individualized, embodied experience. In the words of Ann Cahill, we need to ask ourselves,
“Who are the beings being raped?” (49).

Responding to Rape Narratives
In her book Right Wing Woman, Andrea Dworkin writes:
The accounts of rape […] and the other commonplaces of female experience that
are excavated from the past or given by contemporary survivors should leave the
heart seared, the mind in anguish, the conscience in upheaval. But they do not. No
matter how often these stories are told, with whatever clarity or eloquence,
bitterness or sorrow, they might as well have been whispered in wind or written in
sand: they disappear, as if they were nothing. (20)
We are daily bombarded with stories of rape, often told from the victim-doubting position I
critique earlier. The prevalence of this position with regard to rape victims easily evidences the
frustrating truth of Dworkin’s realization: most narratives of rape indeed “disappear,” both from
the minds of their readers and culture at large. I use Adrienne Rich’s poem “Rape” every
semester with my writing students to talk about poetry and politics. The poem—which puts the
reader in the position of a rape victim, “the maniac’s sperm still greasing your thighs”—is a
powerful testament to the experience of rape victims confronted by a hostile system. The police
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officer in the poem “knows, or thinks he knows, how much you imagined;/ he knows, or thinks
he knows, what you secretly wanted.” The poem ends with the haunting question: “if, in the
sickening light of the precinct,/ your details sound like a portrait of your confessor,/ will you
swallow, will you deny them, will you lie your way home?”
While many of my female students (and some male students) recognize that the poem is
about the continued violation of female rape victims in a system that is automatically suspicious
of their motives and doubtful of their narratives, I am consistently surprised by a small but angry
minority of male students who are incredibly resistant to this reading. The first semester we read
this poem in class, one student (after a vibrant discussion in which a student who had herself
been raped connected the poem to her own experience) blurted out, “I wish women would just
stop talking about rape already.” Just this past semester, a student dismissively commented that
the speaker of the poem is “hysterical” and “hates all men.” Another very angrily defended the
cop in the poem as “just doing his job.” Even after we then analyzed the specific language and
imagery Rich uses to describe the cop, he maintained this position.
I actually shouldn’t be surprised by these reactions; they merely echo very popular
cultural stereotypes about rape and its victims, and evidence an anxious desire on behalf of some
men to defend their sex class against what they perceive as feminist “paranoia” about rape. The
“Not all men are rapists!” defense is commonly used in response to systematic feminist analysis
of patriarchy such as Brownmiller’s or Dworkin’s. As Schweikart and Flynn remind us, “the
reader is a producer of meaning; what one reads out of a text is always a function of the prior
experiences; ideological commitments; interpretive strategies; and cognitive, moral,
psychological and political interests that one brings to the reading” (Schweickart and Flynn 2).
Hence the wide spectrum of reactions, from empathetic recognition, to disbelief, to anger, to
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venomous attack, with which rape narratives are met. However, while “[i]t may be true that
readers can read in various ways, […] are all these ways equally valid, valuable, or acceptable?”
(Schweickart and Flynn 3). Few instances evidence more emphatically that the answer to this
question must be an insistent “no” if we truly believe that reading practices have a shaping role
in transforming culture. Violent readings that purport to judge whether a rape survivor has “lied”
abdicate the reader of the responsibility to engage with the other as a subject bearing witness to
her own experience. Schaffer and Smith quote Hesford and Kozol, who write that:
Personal testimony, understood and judged unproblematically as evidentiary,
turns the speaker into a victim and molds his or her story into a case history, a
piece of positivist evidence […] [T]he reduction of testimony of remembered
experience to evidence judged either as purely factual or mendacious, obscures
the ways in which narratives of suffering offer bits of evidence that cannot easily
be reduced to evidence. (37)

Although widely divergent in form and purpose, any account of rape—from literary memoirs to
courtroom testimony—can be experienced as a “difficult” text, one in which gaps and elisions
signify. As Herman notes, in “the course of reconstruction, the story [of the survivor of rape]
may change as missing pieces are recovered. This is particularly true in situations where the
patient has experienced significant gaps in memory. Thus, both patient and therapist must accept
the fact that they do not have complete knowledge, and they must learn to live with ambiguity”
(Herman 180). The willingness to read from and into a space that may constantly revise and rewrite itself is a necessary challenge for those who seek to meaningfully engage with accounts of
rape.
As Suzette Henke reminds us, “[i]t seems likely that marginalized individuals, both male
and female, tend more frequently to invoke subversive and subvocal iterations to re-member the
fragmented subject and regain an enabling sense of psychic coherence” (Henke xix). We may see
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this insight evidenced more explicitly in memoir that addresses sexual assault—in Alexander’s
Fault Lines, for instance, which interrogates the palimpsestic nature of knowledge and narrative
with regard to repressed memories of sexual assault, and in Brison’s Aftermath, which
deliberately thwarts any attempt at mastery. Yet it is not only such literary texts that may elicit
valuable insights into cultural response to rape narratives—from student responses to peerauthored work to public comments on newspaper articles, reactions to accounts of rape vary as
dramatically as the accounts themselves. Reader-response theory can offer us a valuable
framework to begin to understand some of these divergent reactions: “By bringing their unique
backgrounds and values to the words on the page, readers actualize the text into a meaningful
work that in turn stimulates response. Meaning, therefore, should be attributed not to the text or
reader but to the dynamic transaction between the two” (Schweickart and Flynn 4). All readings
are products of the interactions between personal experience and larger cultural scripts. These
readings may reinforce prevailing paradigms, or disrupt them. There is a constant loop in which
individual readings of particular narratives and general cultural narratives feed into each other;
each may be altered in response to such an exchange. My interest here is in how a multiplicity of
ethical individual readings may have the potential to ultimately intervene in the mainstream
response to rape, in which doubt and repression are the predominant mechanisms for dealing
with such an “unspeakable” event.
By approaching a trauma-informed text from a standpoint of openness and reciprocity,
and engaging with it on its own terms, we privilege practices that veer away from judiciallybased reading models. “Personal narratives and witnessing spur critical awareness of cultural
difference and initiate possibilities for intersubjective exchange beyond the certainties of a secure
sense of selfhood” (Schaffer and Smith 233). And because “[t]he meaning of a text is not the
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product of isolated readers but the collaborative product of a community of readers”
(Schweickart and Flynn 6), it thus becomes possible to collectively re-write mainstream
narratives of rape by encouraging reading practices—in our texts, in our classrooms, and in our
courtrooms—that privilege ethical interaction with the experiences of another, no matter their
form. Taslitz maintains that “the muting and distortion of women’s and minorities’ stories at
trials work to support group subordination. The framing of narrative, therefore, carries
profoundly political implications” (Taslitz 148). He thus puts an onus on the legal system “to
unsettle cultural narratives” by educating jurors about the (often counter-intuitive) sociology of
rape: “The goal would be to open jurors’ minds to plausible alternative tales to the dominant
ones” (Taslitz 132). The presentation of counter-narratives that take into account the nature of
trauma and the demographics of rape can lead audiences (here, the audience of the jury, whose
response to rape narratives has immediate and immensely important consequences) to re-think
their point of entry into stories of rape. “When a jury judges an act ‘consensual,’ it […] creates
an interpretive truth based on its notions of worthy, coherent narratives and its moral judgment
about the gendered meaning to be ascribed to the man’s and woman’s social behavior” (Taslitz
141). Providing juries with alternate lenses to approach testimony that does not fit into the lenses
they have already acquired may, Taslitz suggests, encourage more comprehensive and ethical
readings.
As Sebold and Brison attest, however, while successful prosecution of rape is important,
it is not enough to halt the traumatic aftermath experienced by victims of sexual assault. Many
victims turn to either therapy or therapeutic writing in the wake of rape. While the act of piecing
together a story of rape may be necessary, Judith Herman stresses that “[b]y itself, reconstructing
the trauma does not address the social or relational dimension of the traumatic experience”
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(Herman 183). In I and Thou Martin Buber delineates two kinds of relationships: I-It and I-Thou.
I-It relationships are relationships between subject and object, characterized by separateness. IThou relationships are relationships between mutual subjects, characterized by reciprocity and
recognition. The world of It:
move[s] man to look on the world of It as the world in which he has to live, and
in which it is comfortable to live, as the world, indeed, which offers him all
manner of incitements and excitements, activity and knowledge. In this chronicle
of solid benefits the moments of the Thou appear as strange lyric and dramatic
episodes, seductive and magical, but tearing us to dangerous extremes, loosening
the well-tried context, leaving more questions than satisfaction behind them,
shattering security (34).
Only when we inhabit this space of “shattered security” can we truly enter into a framework
where recognition of the other, and her irreducible experience, becomes not only a possible act,
but a necessary and desirable one. In The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry engages with the
vocabularies and processes that surround acts of war, torture, and other moments (such as rape)
where the human body is “unmade.” Scarry offers a framework that lends itself to the acts of
reading/writing trauma:
To witness a moment when pain causes a reversion to the pre-language of cries
and groans is to witness the destruction of language; but conversely, to be present
when a person moves up out of that pre-language and projects the facts of
sentience into speech is almost to have been permitted to be present at the birth of
language itself. (6)

In its present, pain is resistant to language (4). Yet when this pain is spoken, it may have
transformative effects not only on the speaker, but on the listener, who is invited to share in the
unimaginable made imaginable. For those who choose to tell their stories of violation even in the
face of overwhelming hostility and doubt, the presence of an audience committed to engaging
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with such utterances from a non-defensive position can be helpful in fostering the kind of
relationship envisioned by Buber.
Suzette Henke argues that the act of writing itself can have beneficial effects for trauma
survivors, who can simulate the relationship between writer/witness through the construction of
an imagined, proxy audience: “The act of life-writing serves as its own testimony and, in so
doing, carries through the work of reinventing the shattered self as a coherent subject capable of
meaningful resistance to received ideologies and of effective agency in the world” (Henke xix).
Henke’s argument, which I will return to in my next chapter, is compelling, and I don’t mean to
suggest that a survivor’s narrative gains its value solely from an empathetic reception. However,
considering the fact that “[l]ife narratives have become salable properties in today’s markets”
(Schaffer and Smith 23), and that stories of sexual violence continue proliferate, it seems more
important than ever that there is an audience that is attuned to the particular demands of traumabased text:
Personal narratives expand audiences of people around the globe educated about
human rights abuses. As they reach larger and larger audiences, they can affect
readers and prompt acts of engagement with persons having experienced rights
abuses. Within the context of life narrating, claims take on a human dimension,
calling for the listener/reader to become more self-reflexive more informed, more
active […] While such narrative acts and readings are not a sufficient ground for
social change, they are a necessary ground. (Schaffer and Smith 226)

The transformation of rape culture is indeed deeply connected to narrative and reading practices,
but, as Schaffer and Smith hint, “translating” the embodied experience of sexual assault into
language does not, in and of itself, “solve” the complex and lasting results of such violence for
an individual or a culture:
Sexual violence, for everything that it is, is definitely not a problem of
psychological recovery, narrative transaction, social hierarchy, historical amnesia,
patriarchal oppression, or cultural rhetoric. It is a problem of understanding the
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lived relations among all of these complex horizons. Of course, sexual violence is
also a problem of the relations between and among people, a problem customarily
referred to as politics. That these relations are structured by a discourse, a way of
speaking about and representing human horrors, passions, and abuses cannot be
contested. But this can only be a start, since language—like culture—inevitably
excludes and erases what does not fit. (Heller 348)
Heller’s insight into the limits of language is a key realization, and one I will return to later, but I
want to end here by insisting that the continued construction—and the ethical reception—of rape
narratives is of overwhelming import. These acts can not only help victims of violence regain
control of their own experience, but are valuable in expanding narrowly conceived social
constructions of what rape victims “are like.” The relentless cultural transmission of all stories
of sexual assault—partial, fragmented, “imperfect” as they may be—is one way to confront the
reality of rape and shape our knowledge of its reality. Each story of rape varies in its particulars;
there is no one narrative that can contain these explosive and singular moments of disruption.
Yet, placed beside each other, these experiences come to meaning in a larger societal narrative in
which rape has always been a shaping factor, and function as a reminder of the complex power
associated with not only the telling, but the hearing, of such stories.
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Chapter Three

My Words Would Have Murdered: De-Oedipalizing Analysis
[I]t would be a good thing to have a second method of arriving at the aetiology of
hysteria, one in which we should feel less dependent on the assertions of the
patients themselves.
—Sigmund Freud

In her book The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World, Elaine Scarry
writes that “whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part through its unsharability, and it ensures
this unsharability through its resistance to language” (4). Precise language is not always an
available vehicle for those who experience trauma. One of the key aspects of trauma is that it
surfaces “not as a verbal narrative but as a symptom” (Herman 1). Yet as Meena Alexander
writes in Poetics of Dislocation, “what is unspoken, even unspeakable must be born into
language” (93). While “the challenge of finding language that is true to traumatic experience is
[…] a daunting one” (Brison xi), it is also often a necessary step for the victim of trauma to regain control of her own body and experiences. In addition, making public the hidden stories of
violation that can prop up damaging and fatalistic narratives about the psychology of women—
narratives such as “the natural sexual passivity of women explains their being more inclined to
hysteria” (Freud 96)—has the potential to productively disrupt such narratives and lead to
cultural transformation on a larger scale.
In his Clinical Diary, Freud’s former pupil Sandor Ferenczi defines trauma as a “reaction
to an ‘unbearable’ external or internal stimulus in an autoplastic manner (modifying the self)
instead of an alloplastic manner (modifying the stimulus)” (181). The object of analysis is to
reconstitute a self that “recalls” the traumatic event and thus ends its subconscious repetition
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(182). Unlike Freud’s model of analysis, which stresses the objectivity of the analyst4, Ferenczi’s
therapeutic model is insistently dialogic. The process of psychic reparation demands the joint
arrival of analysand and analyst at the moment of trauma, and it is only through the active
participation of the analyst as a caring witness that the psyche of the analysand can be “repaired”
(182)
Although Ferenczi’s work offers multiple and rich insights for those interested in trauma
theory and literature, his name has never had anywhere near the cachet of Freud or Lacan,
seldom popping up in literary journals or anthologized collections. In his book Sandor Ferenczi:
The Psychotherapist of Tenderness and Passion, Arnold Rachman states that “it is now a matter
of record that Ferenczi’s clinical work and theoretical ideas were suppressed, censored, and
removed from mainstream psychoanalysis” (xv), particularly by Freud and Jones. In recent
years, a number of analysts, including Rachman, have excavated this history and brought to light
the meaningful contributions Ferenczi has made to the field of psychoanalysis—particularly his
privileging of the qualities of empathy and flexibility, as well as his significant insights into the
causes, effects, and treatment of trauma. By repressing Ferenczi’s work on trauma, the
psychoanalytic establishment also largely succeeded in repressing its own investment in keeping
the widespread phenomenon of childhood sexual assault hidden. Revisiting the work of Ferenczi
may thus be especially meaningful for scholars who wish to explore questions of trauma,
textuality, and relationality in a larger cultural context of systematic violence without relying
solely on oedipal paradigms that enact such repressive strategies.

4

In his “Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis,” Freud writes: “I cannot advise my colleagues
too urgently to model themselves during psycho-analytic treatment on the surgeon, who puts aside all his feelings,
even his human sympathy, and concentrates his mental forces on the single aim of performing the operation as
skillfully as possible” (359).
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Additionally, while Ferenczi’s work offers a compelling alternative to strictly Freudian
ways of understanding, it also complicates the popular myth of some sort of one to one
correspondence between “writing” and “healing.” While the work of therapists and writers from
Judith Herman to Maxine Hong Kingston indeed suggests powerful links between storytelling
and psychological recovery, these links are more complex and nuanced than some of the
simplified, mainstream discourse allows5. It becomes too easy to imagine the act of reconstituting a self unmade by trauma through the simple construction of a cohesive narrative. In
mainstream narratives of trauma (as well as popular “self help” literature) we may often
encounter a traditional oedipal paradigm that consists of: 1.) a state of unity; 2.) disruption
through trauma; 3.) a triumphant reconstitution through language; 4.) a stronger being, made
powerful by successfully overcoming the (potentially but not ultimately) destructive encounter.
Such a script obviously calls to mind the “trauma and redemption” plot I question earlier. It can
also lead to the kind of victim-blaming rhetoric popular in the “courtroom” approach that seeks
to dismantle the narratives of women whose processes of disclosure/transformation do not take
such a linear path. By choosing to depart from this model, both writers and readers of womanauthored work that eschews linear narrative—especially work centered on sexual or other
trauma—can gain access to new and valuable insights into trauma and its re-construction.
Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary connects the idea of re-vision with psychic survival in
particularly interesting ways. In it, Ferenczi “justifies the importance he assigns to trauma and
develops a theory of trauma—its effects and treatment” (Dupont xvii). He argues that “[A]n
abreaction of quantities of the trauma is not enough; the situation must be different from the
actual traumatic one in order to make possible a different, favorable outcome. The most essential
5

One of the first Google hits that comes up for “writing and healing”, for example, is a for-profit on-line “course”
entitled “Self Healing Expressions” that vaguely promises readers ,“From the stresses of unemployment to cancer,
studies reveal…writing heals.”
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aspect of the altered repetition is the relinquishing of one’s own rigid authority and the hostility
hidden in it” (Ferenczi 108). Like Susan Brison, Ferenczi insists on the necessity of essentially
re-writing the moment of trauma in order to make sense of it. He also designates a special role
for the witness of the traumatic event:
One would think that the perpetual repetition in analysis of the traumatic
experience, stressing first one factor and then another, would in the end result in a
mosaic-like reconstruction of the whole picture. This does in fact happen, but only
with a feeling of speculative reconstruction and not with the firm conviction that
the events were real. ‘Something’ more is required to transform the intellectual
coherence of the possible or probable into a more solid cohesion of a necessary or
even obvious reality. (Ferenczi 24)
That “something more,” for Ferenczi, is the presence of a compassionate listener who can assure
the victim of the reality of her experience.
My purpose in this chapter is to explore some of the possibilities that adopting a nonoedipal analytic mindset can have when engaging with trauma-based narrative. I examine the
significant ways in which Ferenczi re-writes the Freudian analytic paradigm to introduce the
importance of factors such as trust, compassion, and belief. I re-visit some of the texts I have
engaged with earlier to posit that through the use of strategies such as fragmentation and
absence, contemporary writers such as Meena Alexander, Theresa Cha, and Maxine Hong
Kingston demand a reader who is invested in co-creating multiple selves and stories that make
sense of trauma in diverse ways. By entering into dialogue with such work, we not only gain key
insight into the nature of trauma and its inscription, but also take part in the kind of flexible,
dialogic witnessing process called for by not only Ferenczi, but the authors of the texts
themselves.
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Sandor Ferenczi and Reparative Reading
[P]aranoia for all its vaunted suspicion acts as though its work would be
accomplished if only it could finally, this time, somehow get its story truly known.
—Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
In “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, Or, You’re So Paranoid You Probably
Think This Essay Is About You,” Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick notices that the kinds of critical habits
associated with a “hermeneutics of suspicion” have become “nearly synonymous with criticism
itself” (124). She points out that “to theorize out of anything but a paranoid critical stance has
come to seem naïve, pious, or complaisant” (126). She also reminds us that this codified paranoia
is not inevitable—it is, as she states, merely “a possibility among other possibilities” (125).
Sedgwick’s own interest in “reparative reading practices”—practices that involve a
“hermeneutics of recovery of meaning” (125); that “extract sustenance from the objects of a
culture” (151)—is instructive. While she ironically notes Freud’s own admission that “the
delusions of paranoiacs have an unpalatable, external similarity and internal kinship to the
systems of our philosophers” (125), her commitment to opening spaces for pleasure and
amelioration speak back to this stance, paving the way for reparative readings that nourish and
sustain.
One of the hallmarks of Freudian analysis is its insistence on what Freud, in his
“Autobiographical Study,” calls “candor” (25). Any reticence on the part of the analysand is
viewed as “resistance.” In his notes on the “Rat Man,” for instance, he writes: “Violent struggle,
bad day. Resistance, because I requested him yesterday to bring a photograph of the lady with
him—i.e. to give up his reticence about her. Conflict as to whether he should abandon the
treatment or surrender his secrets” (312). In his paper entitled “On Beginning the Treatment,” he
advises fellow analysts that “one must mistrust all prospective patients who want to make a delay
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before beginning their treatment” (365). In perhaps his most well-known skeptical stance, Freud,
unable to cope with the sheer number of his patients who had been victims of childhood sexual
assault, ultimately abandoned his seduction theory, positing instead that his patients’ hysteria had
its roots in fantasy.
This move, in which (predominantly) women’s accounts of childhood sexual abuse were
discounted, was famously contested by feminist research of the 1970s and 80s (Herman 30).
However, it was also disputed much earlier, by one of Freud’s own pupils. In his essay “Ferenczi
and Sexuality,” Rachman points out that “Ferenczi challenged the traditional notion, found both
in Freudian psychoanalysis and in the attitudes of the lay public, that a report of sexual abuse is
the fantasy of the child and therefore is unreliable” (90). In his Clinical Diary, Ferenczi notes
that “such incidents [of sexual abuse] are much more frequent than one would imagine” (189).
Ferenczi views the reality and frequency of such incidents as a basis for revising a Freudian
understanding of infantile sexuality. He questions the inevitability of concepts such as the
“Oedipus complex”, for example: “Experiences regarding the traumatic effect of genital attacks
by adults on small children oblige me to modify the analytic view of infantile sexuality that has
prevailed up to now […] one has to ask oneself how much […] of the Oedipus complex is really
inherited and how much is passed on by tradition” (Ferenczi 79). Ferenczi’s awareness of the
cultural origins of such complexes is hugely significant—unlike “heredity,” societal patterns
such as the wide-scale abuse of children and the rape of women have the potential to be
transformed through action that springs from an awareness of these (often hidden) stories6.
Ferenczi consistently adopted a stance of belief towards his patients, maintaining that he
did “not exclude the possibility that delusional productions contain more objective reality than
6

In light of this insight, it’s interesting to note that the famous Anna O., “the mute hysteric who had invented the
‘talking cure’ found her voice, and her sanity” not through her therapy with Breuer and Freud, but in “the women’s
liberation movement” (Herman 19).
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we have assumed until now. From the very beginning I was inclined to think that the
hallucinations of the insane [...] are not imaginings but real perceptions” (58). Skepticism,
Freud’s de facto mode, is replaced by a willingness to recognize the possibility of truth in a
patient’s narrative, especially with regard to childhood sexual violence. This act of listening is
particularly important because:
In most cases of infantile trauma, the […] usual cure is repression: ‘it’s nothing at
all’; nothing has happened’; ‘don’t think about it’ […] Such things are simply
hidden in a deadly silence; the child’s faint references are ignored or even rejected
as incongruous, with the unanimous concurrence of those around him, and with
such consistency that the child has to give up and cannot maintain his own
judgment. (Ferenczi 25)
Ferenczi’s poignant realization of the traumatizing effects a response of silence and disbelief can
have in the face of an abuse narrative prefigures the work of feminist therapists like Judith
Herman in powerful ways. As Meena Alexander reminds us in “Silenced Writer,” a section of
The Poetics of Dislocation, “Without silence the words we treasure, the words we measure our
lives by, could not appear. But silenced is different” (95).
Ferenczi’s ability to listen to, trust, and empathize with his patients was famous—and
famously criticized by Freud. As Freud’s “Recommendations” make explicit, the traditional
analytic paradigm calls for an “opaque” analyst who shows his patients “nothing but what is
shown to him” (361). In his compassionate re-writing of this wisdom, Ferenczi stresses the role
of analyst as witness as early as 1932, remarking on the re-traumatization that can occur when
the victim of trauma is met with “stupid and boring analytical questions” rather than genuine
empathy, from her analyst: “In therapy Ferenczi tried to revive the traumatic sequence, and find
a new resolution by offering what had previously not been offered: a trustful atmosphere”
(Haynal 65). There’s no telling the damage that Freud did to his patients by essentially
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disbelieving their experiences. Ferenczi hypothesizes that the reason for this disbelief sprung
from the fact that “[s]ince making this discovery [that “hysterics lie”] Freud no longer loves his
patients. He has returned to the love of his well-ordered and cultivated superego […] Since this
shock, this disillusionment, there is much less talk of trauma, the constitution now begins to play
the principal role. Of course this involves a certain amount of fatalism” (Ferenczi 93).
Traumatized by the (embarrassing) “betrayal” Freud experienced at the hands of his female
patients, he sought refuge by adopting a stance of coldness and skepticism.
Ferenczi was unable to come to terms with the fact that so much of Freudian analysis was
invested in replicating the sins of the father, thus repeating the trauma. He instead urged analysts
to “take really seriously the role one assumes, of the benevolent and helpful observer, that is,
actually to transport oneself with the patient into that period of the past (a practice Freud
reproached me for, as being not permissible), with the result that we ourselves and the patient
believe in its reality” (Ferenczi 24). When such transportation does not occur, “the patient prefers
to doubt his own judgment rather than believe in our coldness, our lack of intelligence, or in
simpler terms, our stupidity and nastiness” (Ferenczi 25). (This process is labeled by some
contemporary feminists as “gaslighting.”) Ferenczi notes that “patients cannot believe that an
event really took place […] if the analyst, as the sole witness of events, persists in his cool,
unemotional, and, as patients are fond of stating, purely intellectual attitude, while the events are
of a kind that must evoke, in anyone present, emotions of revulsion, anxiety, terror, vengeance,
grief, and urge to render immediate help” (Ferenczi 24). Precise interpretation is not enough.
“My words would have murdered,” he realizes at one point; “I would have injected the irritating,
exciting poison, I would have created the anticipation of an orgasm, and then I would obtain the
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displacement of the love-object” (54). Analysis cannot be accomplished by “intellectual means
alone” (54).
Both Ferenczi and his student Michael Balint attempted to create a sort of “holding
environment” in the analytic setting, providing a space where they and their patients could work
together to produce meaning. In The Basic Fault, Balint uses metaphors of the fetus in the womb
and the fish in the sea to invoke the concept of a “harmonious mix-up” in which there are “no
sharp boundaries”; “environment and individual penetrate into each other” (Balint 67). Balint
conceptualizes the analytic setting as, ideally, this kind of pre-traumatic environment. Ferenczi’s
metaphors are different, but his insistence on the dialogic nature of analysis—patient and analyst
must work together in a non-hierarchical relationship—is continually striking. When a patient’s
trauma is recalled in Ferenczian therapy, the analyst must offer “encouragement” and “a flood of
healing compassion” (Ferenczi 15). Both Ferenczi and Balint write about the importance of faceto-face contact with the patient, and at times of holding a patient’s hand during therapy. The
contact between analyst and analysand cannot be superficial if healing is to take place. For
Ferenczi and Balint, witnessing is active work. As Elaine Scarry points out, “For the person in
pain, so incontestably and unnegotiably present is it that ‘having pain’ may come to be thought
of as having certainty,’ while for the other person it is so elusive that ‘hearing about pain’ may
exist as the primary model of what it is ‘to have doubt’” (Scarry 4). The work of Ferenczi
evidences a powerful attempt to move beyond that space of doubt and into the reality of
another’s pain.
Since “the ordinary response to atrocities is to banish them from consciousness” (Herman
1), the work of writing (as well as reading) trauma is both difficult and necessary. The concept of
the witness has become an integral one for writers, theorists, and scholars who work with
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traumatic knowledge in any form. The work of contemporary women memoirists who challenge
the traditional biases in Freudian ways of reading, knowing, and responding provide us with a
particularly insightful window into some of the many possibilities that lie beyond the paradigm
of linear narrative, doubt, and authoritative interpretation.

The Wound I Could Not Carry in Memory: Writing Trauma
In Fault Lines, Meena Alexander writes, “What I have learned to remember is the wound
I could not carry in memory. I must write it out if I am to go on living […] I turn to flashes of
remembrance, bits and pieces of memory, backlit, given at high intensity, so I can piece my life
together again” (237). While Judith Dupont writes that “[o]nly therapeutic intervention from the
outside can […] break the isolation” of the trauma victim (xix), Suzanne Henke makes a
powerful case for the connection between the analytic setting and the act of self-writing, drawing
a parallel between the object of psychoanalysis and that of “scriptotherapy”—both, she argues,
transform the “frozen imagery” associated with trauma into a contextualized narrative. Henke
maintains that life-writing can “effectively mimic the scene of psychoanalysis,” providing “a
therapeutic alternative” for trauma survivors (xii). She questions the necessity of the literal
presence of an analyst, using the work of Shoshana Felman to posit that “a surrogate
transferential process can take place through the scene of writing that allows its author to
envisage a sympathetic audience” (xii).
As Ferenczi notes in his Clinical Diary, “a neoformation of the self is impossible without
the previous destruction, either partial or total, or dissolution of the former self. A new ego
cannot be formed directly from the previous ego, but from fragments” (181). It’s no coincidence
that writers like Alexander and Cha stress the importance of the fragment in their work. In
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Dictee, for example, Cha writes of “decapitated forms […] Would-be said remnant, memory. But
the remnant is the whole” (38). By re-establishing the links between the present and the past, Cha
suggests, the past may become present. This significantly echoes the work of Ferenczi, who
sought to re-call the moment of his patients’ traumas so that they might be re-experienced (and
repaired) in the present. The fact that Dictee is presented to its audience in a fractured state also
evokes the need of a witness who can sift through the fragments in order to produce a reading
that makes meaning of the memories encoded in the text.
For Cha, “Inside is the pain of speech the pain to say. Larger still. Greater than is the pain
not to say” (3). Given this, we may wonder, “Why resurrect it all now. From the Past. History,
the old wound” (33). Cha’s reasons for speaking evoke those of Ferenczi’s analysands, who wish
to halt the subconscious repetition of their traumas. “To name it now so as not to repeat history
in oblivion. To extract each fragment by each fragment from the word from the image another
word another image the reply that will not repeat history in oblivion” (33). Remembering again
becomes a necessary act, a re-construction of not only self, but of history. The hope of
recollection is the end of repetition. Trauma, until it is named, exists in the present, cannot
become memory. Trauma “is burned into your ever-present memory. Memory less. Because it is
not in the past. It cannot be...It burns” (45).
If one accepts that the ultimate significance of the analytic process lies in the fact that it is
a mutual endeavor, it begins to make sense that any (re)construction of self must be a dialogic
act—whether literally, as in the case of Ferenczi’s patients, or figuratively, through the sort of
imaginative process Henke envisions in her examination of women who use writing as “a
different kind of therapeutic tool” (141). Cha herself speaks of textual creation as a process of
formation requiring more than one: “You write. You write you speak voices hidden
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masked...From one mouth to another, from one reading to the next the words are realized in their
full meaning” (48). Through multiple, shared readings, words come to mean more fully; meaning
halts pain, constructs beginnings. The invention of self that occurs within the text is,
significantly, a process enacted when “you, as viewer and guest, enter the house. It is you who
are entering to see her. Her portrait is seen through her things, that are hers” (Cha 100). The
construction of self and text intertwine, and require the presence of a witness. In Dictee, pieced
together from fragments of selves and the recollection of hidden memories, new and remembered
identities emerge: “Dead words. Dead tongue. From disuse. Buried in Time’s memory.
Unemployed. Unspoken. History. Past. Let the one who is diseuse...Restore memory” (133). In
the recitation of the forgotten is the power to “restore” the memory that history has sought to
erase.
In the coda to Fault Lines, entitled “Book of Childhood,” Meena Alexander explores the
trauma hidden beneath the surface of her original memoir, reconstructing both self and narrative
from memories that surface through the body: “It began with a New York summer when I could
not breathe properly […] In the hidden places of my body a cold sweat broke out” (238). Before
the past may become present through language, it announces itself in altered form: “Pain
afflicted my back. My torso was utterly numb. I had always believed in the truth of the body.
What was my own body telling me now?” (240). While the atomization of self that occurs as the
result of trauma serves, as Ferenczi points out, a protective function, it also calls into question a
stable narrative where body, identity, and history cohere: “Such phantasmic violence is hard to
put into words. It’s like watching a horror show in which the ‘I’ is an unwilling participant”
(Alexander 238). The buried past surfaces in fragments: “What I saw came to me as if flashes of
lightning were breaking into the darkness” (Alexander 239).
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As memories of the sexual abuse Alexander suffered at the hands of her maternal
grandfather resurge, they force her to revise the very foundation of her self-narrative: “I was
tormented by the feeling that I had written a memoir that was not true” (241). The underlying
structure of experience is disrupted by traumatic knowledge: “What foundations did my house
stand on? What sort of architect was I if the lowest beams were shredded?” (Alexander 241). As
both Alexander and Brison remind us, trauma does not merely interrupt a cohesive narrative; it
compels us to recognize that “there was never a coherent self (or story) there to begin with”
(Brison 116). Self-writing is inherently a provisional act. It is also necessary to survival. Ferenczi
himself asks at one point: “Must I (if I can) create a new basis for my personality, if I have to
abandon as false and untrustworthy the one I have had up to now? Is the choice here between
dying and ‘rearranging’ myself?” (Ferenczi qtd in Dupont i). Alexander’s coda bears witness to
both the necessity and the difficulty of the sort of “rearrangement” envisioned by Ferenczi, and
to the construction of narratives that offer sustenance, but can also be continually revised.
Alexander writes that: “To be haunted by the illegible is the fate of those who have
passed through fire and children who have been hurt beyond visible measure” (317). Ferenczi,
exploring the lasting traumatic effects of childhood sexual abuse, hypothesizes that “[t]he
traumatic aloneness, the father’s prohibition and his will to prohibit, the mother’s deafness and
blindness, that is what really renders the attach traumatic, that is, causing the psyche to crack”
(Ferenczi 193). This realization is echoed in Alexander’s coda: “My mother, it seemed to me as I
read my book again, was constantly averting her eyes, looking elsewhere, not seeing, not able to
see” (241). Both Ferenczi and Henke point to the re-constitutive power of the act of re-imagining
and revising trauma in the presence of a (real or constructed) witness. Alexander writes: “My
father was the one person I could have told. But by 1997, when bits and pieces of my childhood
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were restored to me, my father […] was really dying” (241). She thus imagines telling her
father—“He would believe me instantly. He would feel the rage I still could not trust myself to
feel […] He would yell at my maternal grandfather. Appa would carry me away from that house,
drag my mother away too, swear at Ilya, ‘We will never enter this house again’” (241).
Alexander’s father becomes the witness who can halt the recurring story of violation and
forgetting by believing and responding in an appropriate way.
The response to bodily violation may necessitate additional, somatic responses as well.
“Once hearing the panic in my voice, [my therapist] asked me what had comforted me when I
was a child. Holding on to trees, I told her” (Alexander 240). After her therapist urges her do just
that, Alexander finds a lilac tree in Fort Tryon Park: “I stood there, a grown woman, and held
tight to the tree. I could feel my flesh again, clarified, sap and bark upholding me” (240).
“Recovery” cannot be accomplished by “intellectual means alone” (Ferenczi 51). As Alexander
powerfully reminds us: “There is an instinctual truth of the body all the laws of the world
combined cannot legislate away” (Alexander 242). By embodying these traumatic experiences in
text, Alexander calls attention to the complex relationships between flesh and language. As
Rothschild remarks: “Language bridges the mind/body gap” (Rothschild 173). It is by
acknowledging the hidden story surfacing in flashes beneath her original memoir that Alexander
can begin to revise her self-narrative: “I kept starting over and over again. I touched the soil of
my self, a field with its necessary knowledge, harsh, shining, buried in bits and pieces” (242).
Through the act of “entering an old text from a new […] direction” (Rich 629), “[t]he girl child
and the woman flow together” (Alexander 243). The “Book of Childhood” is integrated into, but
not absorbed by, the original narrative. The two exist side by side, bearing witness to a constant
negotiation between past and present, body and memory.
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Alexander’s coda repeatedly interrogates this border between silence/speech:
Zone of radical illiteracy in which I write, translating myself through borders,
recovering the chart of a give syntax, the palpable limits of place, to be rendered
legible through poetry which fashions an immaterial dwelling yet leaves within
itself traces of all that is nervous, stoic, edgy. The skin turned inside out. (260)
The relationship between the interior truth of the body and the need to translate this truth into
language is at the heart of Alexander’s project: “The interior of the house of language, fitful,
flashing. And under the house of language, a fiery muteness, this zone of radical illiteracy
Where we go when words cannot yet happen, where a terrible counter-memory wells up” (260).
Alexander, through the act of writing, enables herself to situate the trauma that lies beneath the
surface of her original memoir and “somatic memory becomes personal history” (Rothschild
173). Yet this act takes place with the full knowledge that there is no comfortable foundation on
which to rest the language borne from the unspeakable, the traumatic. Such writing will always
take place on a precipice; it will always be situated precariously.
In Kingston’s The Woman Warrior, themes of memory, body, and trauma also unfold in
an interesting relation to Ferenczi’s work. In perhaps one of his most intriguing configurations,
Ferenczi theorizes that the psychic fragmentation of trauma (specifically in children) can produce
a “fragment” he calls the “Orpha”: “a singular being, for whom the preservation of life is of
coûte que coûte significance. This fragment plays the role of the guardian angel; it produces
wish-fulfilling hallucinations, consolation fantasies” (9). The Orpha, split off from bodily
consciousness, functions as a protector. The creation of the Orpha is, often at a literal level, an
act of psychic survival. The Orpha becomes indispensable to children who undergo repeated
trauma: “It anesthetizes the consciousness and sensitivity against sensations as they become
unbearable” (Ferenczi 9). The figure of the “woman warrior”—the swordswoman who can enact
violence and offer protection—becomes a powerful guardian, producing fantasies that allow
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Kingston to imagine a different future from the one of “wife and slave” that has been inscribed
for her: “I would have to grow up to be a warrior woman” (20).
I want to end by returning to a different sort of moment in Kingston’s work here,
however—the moment where her childhood silence becomes concretely represented by the
paintings she covered in black paint (165). “It was when I found out I had to talk that school
became a misery” (166). Like fragmentation, silence can perform a valuable protective function.
While my main focus here is on the particular importance of language/narrative, it’s important to
remember the fact that neither Ferenczi nor Balint were afraid to move beyond language with
their patients. Both experimented with physical touch and refused to flatly equate silence with
resistance. A source of censure from the traditional psychoanalytic establishment, Ferenczi’s
awareness of a world beyond linguistic interpretation made possible not only Balint’s amazing
work with borderline patients, but also the work of contemporary therapists like Rothschild who
focus, with immense results, on the importance of somatic techniques with regard to bodily
memory. In Telling, Patricia Weaver Francisco writes about the disassociation she feels during
her rape using familiar metaphors: “I remember this moment from a spot up near the ceiling,
through a consciousness separated from the bodies below […] Only years later, when I learned to
retrieve a bodily memory of the night, did I finally experience some of the details” (28). After a
painful labor that reignites her bodily memory of rape, Francisco begins to get massages, and
ultimately to engage in somatic therapy. Like Alexander’s description of holding tight to a tree,
Francisco’s work bears witness to the power of the body in recovering from violent trauma.
As Sedgwick suggests in Touching Feeling, performative strategies are still too often
ignored by contemporary theory in its privileging of the verbal, although having access to them
opens a rich landscape of textured meaning that exists beside the written and spoken narratives

71
most often associated with traumatic knowledge. In Appointment with Sigmund Freud, for
example, Calle enacts a powerful inquiry into psychoanalytic scripts largely through the
technique of image juxtaposition. Her other work, examined earlier, also relies heavily on imagebased modes of sense-making, and serves as a reminder that there are indeed limitations to
language. Rothschild is careful to point out that, for analysts working with trauma patients,
“[b]ridging the gap between the verbal psychotherapies and the body psychotherapies means
taking the best resources from both, rather than choosing one over the other” (xiii). For anyone
who is invested in the exploration of trauma and its many iterations, it also makes sense to
remain attuned to the diverse array of performances—textual, bodily, and visual—by which
victims of trauma may transform their memory into art, and the variety of witnessing practices
such work may call for.

Listening to Another’s Wound: Readerly Responsibility
and Trauma-based Narrative

Henke reminds us that the term “narrative recovery” evokes “both the recovery of past
experience through narrative articulation and the psychological reintegration of a traumatically
shattered subject” (xxii). The transformation of trauma into art allows the artist to reconstruct the
moment of trauma in narrative form in the presence of an imagined and/or real audience who
serves as witness. But, as Alexander asks, “How can these violent versions of the real that cut
into memory be translated into art? Art in a time of trauma, a necessary translation, ‘fragments
of a vessel,’ writes Walter Benjamin, ‘to be glued together.’ But what if the paste shows, the
seams, the fractures?” (289). The shape of the trauma-based narrative pieced together from
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fragments and flashes may bear witness to its own process of assemblage, allowing the reader to
enter through the fissures:
It seems to me that in its rhythms the poem, the artwork, can incorporate scansion
of the actual, the broken steps, the pauses, the brutal silences, the brutal
explosions. So that what is pieced together is a work that exists as an object in the
world but also, in its fearful consonance, its shimmering stretch, allows the world
entry. I think of it as a recasting that permits our lives to be given back to us,
fragile, precarious. (Alexander 289)

Such work bears testament to both the fragility and the resilience of self. Ferenczi conceptualized
memory as a “collection of scars of shocks in the ego” (Ferenczi 111). The work of memoirists
like Cha and Alexander resists the kind of glossy unity presupposed by more facile notions of
“writing as healing,” instead making visible the scars.
In her essay “Creating Redemptive Imagery: A Challenge of Resistance and Creativity,”
Sandra Campbell speaks of the need for women to “create images, sounds, and stories that
articulate difference, that illuminate paths towards alternatives, indeed that describe the
unfamiliar” in response to the daily cultural onslaught of narratives that promote “domination
and violation” (141). She suggests that when alternate narratives proliferate, cultural attitudes
can shift. The reader who chooses to meaningfully engage with work that disrupts popular
notions about trauma, violence, and the nature of narrative itself can also choose to take on a
responsibility not to replicate the sort of violent interpretation that would re-inscribe widespread
impulses to doubt and/or bury difficult truths about sexual violence and childhood trauma. “The
responsible reader must follow the text’s meandering movements, attend to its heterogeneous
meanings, restrain the impulse to assimilate these into one point of view, [and] acknowledge the
partiality and contingency of all interpretations” (Shweikart and Flynn 17). The reader of traumabased texts is called to be a witness to the complex, difficult, and fragmented truths of the other

73
who is violated as well as the culture in which such violation takes place. To fully engage with
the pain of another is itself a painful act. Being forced to recognize one’s own complicity in such
traumatic experience is also painful. It may be tempting to refuse to enter such a fraught space—
to, as Freud did, facilitate instead an emotional coldness and turn a blind eye to unbearable
realizations.
Yet, as Scarry remarks, “the act of verbally expressing pain is a necessary prelude to the
collective task of diminishing pain” (9). And the act of listening to such expressions is equally
important. Both Ferenczi and Herman speak poignantly about the devastating effects experienced
by trauma survivors whose narratives are met with silence and disbelief. Such acts implicitly
signify that we are choosing to “identify with the perpetrators rather than with the
victim” (Herman 244). In the words of Ferenczi: “[W]hat is the use of [repeating] the trauma
word for word, to have the same disillusionment with the whole world and the whole of
humanity?” (55).
As I mention in my last chapter, embedded in the reading model(s) with which we
approach trauma narratives are ethical and political choices—choices to believe or disbelieve;
choices to take a reparative or paranoid stance; choices to “listen” to silences or to impose our
own interpretations on them. By responding with generosity, rather than skepticism, to texts in
which bodily memory is encoded, we may enter into the kind of compassionate dialogue that
marked Ferenczi’s practice and ultimately led to his falling out with Freud. Simply by
approaching traumatic texts from a position of empathy, rather than doubt, we as readers make
an ethical choice with positive consequences. After all, as Cathy Caruth reminds us, “trauma
may lead [...] to the encounter with another, through the very possibility and surprise of listening
to another’s wound” (8).
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Chapter Four
Reparative Reading in a College Composition Classroom

My first semester teaching composition at my current institution was also the first
semester one of the writers in my class handed in a rape narrative.
An impenetrable piece, elegantly crafted, it told the story of a boy who attacked her at the
age of 14 in powerful, tightly crafted language. It was accompanied by a process letter in which
she included research on the therapeutic effects of writing trauma, as well as revealed the fact
that this was the first time she had ever spoken about being raped.
The following semester, another student chose to write about her rape as well. Her piece
was composed in fragments—short staccato bursts of guttural language interspersed with violent
imagery and angry reflections on male violence. Her process letter didn’t talk much about her
piece itself, but about the additional trauma of coming out as a lesbian in a small Midwestern
town after the rape. We spent hours in my office that semester, talking and ranting and crying—
about composition, and how we compose our lives, but also about patriarchy, violence, and
heteronormativity.
Given the fact that one in four college-aged women have been the victim of rape or
attempted rape, it’s not at all surprising that every semester at least one of the writers in my class
will explicitly write about her own experience with sexual assault. As Michael Blitz and Claude
Mark Hurlbert remind us in Letters for the Living: Teaching Writing in a Violent Age,
““[w]riting and living and teaching are not separable […] our students’ lives are in their
compositions” (2).
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This is not to suggest that most or even many of the students in my classes choose to
write about trauma—simply that, nestled in among the beautiful portraits of foreign cities; the
manifestos on the power of graffiti; and the research blogs about everything from the charms of
particular dog breeds to how to win at poker, there are always darker stories, attempts to make
sense of struggles with bulimia, the murder of a friend, or hidden abuse at the hands of a beloved
grandparent. I want my composition classroom to be a place that welcomes and meaningfully
responds to each of these diverse pieces and writers on their own terms.
My goal in this chapter is to explore, in narrative form, some of the ways in which my
students and I seek to critically engage with acts of composition and response as dialogic, openended, risk-taking practices. I’m very lucky to work at an institution that privileges both teacher
and student autonomy in the writing classroom, and to have had mentors, chairs, and colleagues
who are committed to acknowledging our students’ complex experiences, and proactively
challenging the sometimes violent expectations of an increasingly corporatized educational
system. Working within such a context, I have come to believe that while students who choose to
write about trauma indeed benefit from a reparative classroom experience, such an environment
benefits many other students (and myself, as a teacher), as well.
*
In the summer of 2008, I and a colleague co-taught a summer class through a partnership
our University entered into with the Department of Homeless Services here in New York City.
There were 10 writers in the class, all of whom were parents, and all of whom were currently
living in city shelters.
We had no idea what to expect on our first day, and no idea what the expectations of the
class participants would be. We opened by telling stories—who we were, what had brought us
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there. Then we hammered out a rough plan for the course—participants were intrigued by the
idea of memoir, crafting and preserving their own stories in their own terms, rather than the ones
dictated to them by the institutions on which they depended for survival. There was a lot of anger
in the room, anger at a system that many felt infantilized them and micro-managed their lives.
My colleague and I introduced the idea of a manifesto, which was unanimously met with
excitement. One of the participants suggested that we spend time focusing on resumés, since one
of the goals of the program was job preparation, and that idea was adopted quickly as well.
When lunch arrived, we lost our momentum for a bit, dismayed by the soggy bologna
sandwiches, child-sized juice drinks, and stale cookies provided by the DHS. One of the men
there talked about his struggle with diabetes, and a woman about how she was trying to be a
vegetarian, which was next to impossible at the shelter. Our final (also unanimous) decision that
day was that my colleague and I would bring in healthy, varied, and age-appropriate food for the
group.
That summer, the twelve of us grew close as we wrote and talked and thought and
laughed and ate together. Yet our grand plans for all the pieces we would compose never quite
came to fruition. The only time some of the participants had to actually compose was in-class—
something my colleague and I hadn’t really thought about. Sometimes we would become so
engrossed in conversation that we’d be shocked to realize our time together was over before
we’d workshopped a single piece. People had to miss class because of emergencies. It was rarely
a smooth or linear process. My colleague and I confessed our anxiety to each other—the writing
that we received sometimes seemed all over the place, scraps and sentences and fragments that
didn’t always end up coming together. We took home and responded to short bursts of traumatic
memories; lists of employment history; and the beginnings of angry manifestos.
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On the last day of the course, however, when one of the participants read a stunning
poem she had written about her experience with homelessness that left us all simultaneously
crying and applauding, I realized (as cliché as this sounds) that nothing had ever taught me more
about teaching than this particular workshop. Of course, there were no grades, and this wasn’t a
required course. There was also no expectation at the end that anyone would know how to cite
parenthetically or be able to write a psychology paper with no comma splices. Yet the
participants of the workshop had forced me to be flexible; to respond to what was given to me on
its own terms; and to give each person I was working with what they needed, whether that be
proofreading a letter, a cup of coffee, or a moment of shared anger over an injustice at the
shelter. The participants in this workshop also bore witness to the fact that meaningful writing
projects don’t stop just because a course does. Five years later, one of the women in the group is
still writing her memoir, and we chat about it from time to time. Another ended up copyrighting
her poem, and another used some of the material from our workshop to apply to community
college a few years ago.
That fall, I returned to teaching my composition courses with a renewed determination to
value my students’ ability to make meaningful choices for themselves, as well as an increasing
sense of frustration with the rhetoric of the many writing handbooks that had been shipped to my
office that summer—unasked for and free of charge—in the hopes that I would adopt them in my
course.
*
My first semester teaching writing was as an adjunct at a large public university. I was a
first year Ph.D. student, and, like many first-time composition teachers, I was given little
instruction on how to approach the class beyond being handed a short list of textbooks and
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handbooks from which I had to choose to use in my classroom. I had taken only one course in
Composition/Rhetoric at the Master’s level, and it was taught by a progressive educator whose
own work was radically opposed to the kind of mode-based, thesis-driven writing that still seems
to dominate some composition classrooms.
The department encouraged us to assign a brief “diagnostic” in-class writing assignment
the first day of class. I asked my students—all freshmen—to write about their college experience
so far. I was delighted to read descriptions of the interesting people they’d encountered on their
bus rides; snarky commentary about biology class; funny tales of getting lost on campus; and
proud stories about being the first of a family to attend college. A few weeks into the course,
however, we all found ourselves floundering amongst the largely male, mostly white, authors
who had penned the essays in our anthology. I assigned a “compare and contrast” essay, the
majority of which fell flat. I found myself writing the letter “C” a lot, and wondering why I had
been so excited to teach composition in the first place.
When I think back on this my experience teaching writing, I’m unpleasantly reminded of
the work of anonymous adjunct instructor “Professor X,” whose award-winning 2008 article in
the Atlantic Monthly and subsequent 2012 book share the title “In the Basement of the Ivory
Tower.” X’s thesis is basically that college isn’t for everyone, and his supporting examples are
the students who, in his words, “routinely fail his classes” because their compare and contrast
essays on “Araby” and “Barn Burning” lack the kind of “clarity” he expects from “college-level”
writers.
Luckily for me, I didn’t end up having to fail any of my students that semester. After
talking over my uncomfortable experience with some colleagues from other institutions, I
approached my class with some questions about the direction they wanted the course to go in
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from thereon in. Although I’ve never quite gotten over my guilt at making them spend fifty
dollars on a textbook we ultimately resigned to the rubbish bin a few weeks into the semester,
I’ve also never gotten over my gratitude at the idea that they proposed. Why not, one student
suggested, have them all bring in a variety of pieces for us to select from for future readings?
The class unanimously voted that this would make more sense for them as writers. We
collaboratively designed our next assignment—each student would create a piece in a genre of
their choice, and then another student would analyze the piece. Then the initial writer would use
both their piece and their partner’s analysis to craft a meta-narrative about their writing/reading
process.
I’ve continued to use a version of this assignment unit every semester since then, and by
far it is one of the most well-received assignments in any of my courses. This doesn’t surprise
me; nor does it surprise me that an impoverished assignment such as the “compare and contrast
paper” I first assigned led to the construction of disconnected, half-hearted texts. Knoblauch and
Brannon point out that the “sterile repetitiveness and historical naïveté of [rhetoric textbooks]
create the impression that rhetoric is a monolith, that nothing has changed between Cicero and
Kenneth Burke, that the ideas they reproduce so unreflectively […] about outlines, topic
sentences, comparison/contrast essays, and the like, are as serviceable today as they might have
seemed centuries ago” (3-4). Moving beyond such limited notions of what student writing can be
opened possibilities for my students to make critical connections among their experiences, the
larger social contexts in which these experiences take place, and important questions of style and
form.
I’ve shared this particular narrative with colleagues at various conferences over the years,
specifically at panels questioning the wide-scale programmatic adoption of often expensive,
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often formulaic textbooks and handbooks in the writing classroom. Though certain
presuppositions about what “academic” writing can and “should” be remain codified in such
texts for “beginning writers,” I continue to be drawn to the kind of questions put forth by
scholars like Lad Tobin, who queries, “[W]hy […] don’t we ask literature students to respond to
the short stories they are reading with stories of their own? Why couldn’t a dissertation be a
novel or an academic book be a collage?” (Tobin X). I’m especially interested, though in the
ways my own students speak back to some of the ideas promoted by the hugely profitable
handbook industry—ideas that “academic” writing involves “moves” such as “[employing] a
serious, academic tone and avoid using the first or second person,” or the notion that “your
credibility will be enhanced if you use the third person, which is more objective and gives you
some distance from your topic” (McWhorter). In their blogs, performances, documentaries,
poems, memoirs, and essays, many of my students connect their subject positions and lived
experiences with larger theoretical and critical questions. Issues as varied as the politics of hair,
suburban boredom, and some of the nuanced ways international students adapt to life in America
while retaining their own culture are approached through the lens of personal experience, and
deepened through dialogue with the perspectives of others.
Many of my students come to the course taking for granted that “one” doesn’t use firstperson in academic writing, or that contractions constitute “slang.” In order to explore where
these myths come from, I sometimes bring some of the handbooks that have piled up in my
office to class for students to deconstruct. By openly interrogating the myths about writing that
are perpetuated in many texts for beginning writers, students are able to meaningfully speak back
to a discourse that seeks to control their composition practices in often prescriptive and limited
ways. Some students find the idea that “academic” writing can be a much more malleable and
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open-ended endeavor than they had previously been taught liberating; others are (quite
understandably) frustrated or annoyed by receiving such conflicting messages. Some students
continue to work in more traditional forms and use conventions that they have grown
comfortable with (and which may have led them to experience academic success in the past),
while others throw themselves into creating hybrid texts and pushing the boundaries between the
“critical” and the “creative” in innovative ways. Whether students employ experimental forms or
not, the recognition that they are the ones in control of their writing and are making deliberate
choices with regard to form/content/usage is an important part of what I hope they take away
from our course.
*
In my office, there is a cardboard sculpture of the “Cube” at St. Mark’s Place. It opens up
to reveal a hidden stack of photos the student who designed it has carefully placed inside of her
first and subsequent trips to the area when she arrived in New York City from Korea. There is
also a leather-bound, illustrated book of original, hand-lettered fairytales; a gripping graphic
novel about the Holocaust; and a poster with cartoon versions of major figures in Composition
having a heated debate about “Standard English.”
These particular artifacts from former students provide a brief glimpse into a few of the
ways they have chosen to compose during their time in my course. We begin each semester with
a unit that explores some of the many ways in which composition scholars have conceptualized
the teaching of writing, the result of which is a self-authored “language statement” by each
student (which are revised at the end of the semester), as well as collaboratively designed posters
that are presented to the class. We then move to a “self-portrait” unit, in which we read excerpts
from a variety of texts that construct self in multiple ways (beginning with collage-based texts by
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Joe Brainard, Adrienne Kennedy, and Sophie Calle), and which culminates in each student
crafting a narrative of an aspect of her own experience in a form she feels is appropriate.
Following that is a research unit in which we discuss subject position and critical lenses as each
student chooses a topic and corresponding form in dialogue with the class. The last major unit of
the semester continues to be the project my first group of students designed—the creation of a
work of art (fiction; poetry; sculpture etc.) that will be analyzed by a classmate. The
compositions that my students have constructed over the years serve as a constant reminder to
me that critical, meaningful work can take place across a variety of forms.
In her discussion of multigenre assignments in “The Ins, Outs, and In-Betweens of
Multigenre Writing,” Nancy Mack remarks that “[a]s students generated multiple pieces for their
projects, conflicts arose among differing perspectives of the same event that would not have
occurred had I assigned a more traditional, monogenre format. Multigenre writing has the
potential to make use of the dialogic quality of language.” In his book Resisting Writings (and
the Boundaries of Composition), Derek Owens asks us to envision the writing classroom as “a
highly performative, interdisciplinary exchange of dialects and art forms” (200). He challenges
the production of “pseudo-literature” in the composition classroom, arguing that when “we
enforce genres so dogmatically […] the spontaneity and excitement that can come from mixing,
blurring, overlapping, and dissolving boundaries is lost on the student (not to mention most
teachers)” (21). As an alternative, he proposes valuing the production of literature in a variety of
genres and dialects: “I want writing to be exciting, risky, strange; dull, safe, conventional texts
put me and my students to sleep” (Owens 17). Similarly, several authors in the collection Alt
Dis: Alternative Discourses and the Academy make the case that “alternative forms enable kinds
of intellectual work that cannot be accomplished in traditional academic discourse” (x).
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In the years I’ve been teaching composition, I’ve seen interesting, critical work take place
across a variety of genres. My own students have composed: memoirs; comic strips; pamphlets;
blogs; lists; haikus; essais; recipes; graphic novels; case studies; collages; fiction; business
proposals; documentaries; political theory; investigative journalism; spoken word poetry;
manifestos; fairy tales; song lyrics/music; scripts; photo essays; children’s literature; fan fiction;
annotated bibliographies; advice; one-act plays; and letters. By inviting and warmly receiving
assignments that transgress the bounds of the “traditional” academic paper, I’ve found that my
students’ offerings not only follow their own logics, but also determine the terms of my
response, since it becomes more difficult to enter into inherently surprising territory with a
predetermined notion of what I might find, and what it should look like.
*
I used to assign a more traditional “research paper.” One semester several years ago, a
student handed in a dossier of materials about the Bermuda Triangle, which he was fascinated
with. I was intrigued by the assembled materials—pictures, accounts of missing ships going back
hundreds of years, summaries of various theories, and the student’s own questions, all pasted on
pieces of corrugated cardboard. I loved engaging with the piece, but wasn’t sure how it fit the
assignment guidelines, which included having a “claim” that was backed up with “evidence.”
When I discussed my concern with the student, he responded, “Well, no one really knows. That’s
the point.” He wanted readers to engage with the materials he had presented and come to their
own conclusions if they wished. If such a cool project didn’t fit my assignment guidelines, the
answer was clear to me—I needed to revise the guidelines to make room for more open-ended,
collage-like research practices.
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I want to return here to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s intriguing essay “Paranoid Reading
and Reparative Reading (Or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay is About
You).” Addressing the kinds of reading practices associated with “the hermeneutics of
suspicion,” Sedgwick calls attention to the kind of “faith in exposure” that dominates much
contemporary critical theory, arguing that such practices act as though “to make something
visible as a problem were […] a mere hop, skip and jump away from getting it solved” (139).
Such “paranoid” reading practices look to police a text, exposing the places where “error” (here
used in a broad sense) can be “exposed.”
Although most scholarship on “error” in student writing focuses on what might be called
“surface error,” a reader may also perceive “error” in writing that might seem “too informal” or
“too confessional,” writing that does not give credit where credit is due, writing that is “clichéd”
or “sentimental,” writing that might defy, in any way, implicit expectations of what a “college
level” or “academic” or “scholarly” paper should sound like. Sedgwick calls us “to recognize in
paranoia a distinctively rigid relation to temporality, at once anticipatory and retroactive, averse
above all to surprise” (146). In contrast, I have tried to respond to moments of textual ambiguity
in the work of my students from a position informed by what Sedgwick calls “reparative”
reading practices—practices that “succeed in extracting sustenance from the objects of a culture”
(150). Such practices are generous, meeting texts on their own terms, nourishing and sustaining
both reader and writer.
Responding to texts in such non-prescriptive ways seems especially important when my
students choose to write about trauma. I began this chapter by mentioning two very different rape
narratives composed by former students. The first offered what might be considered a “trauma
and redemption” plot. It sought to make sense of a theretofore unspoken trauma through the use
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of classical narrative strategies such as beginning in media res, character development through
dialogue, the use of specific imagery, and a reflective conclusion. The writer invited me to
respond to both the structure of her piece, as well as the research she had done on writing as a
therapeutic tool. I responded to her text according to her instructions, as well as putting her in
touch with the university’s counseling center after she informed me that she had shared her text
with her mother, and they had agreed that she might benefit from a psycho-therapeutic
relationship.
In contrast, the second rape narrative I received (from a young woman who had been in
and out of therapy for years, and had told this story many times) was not the kind of text that
sought any sort of closure. The writer of this particular text had given herself permission to recreate her experience in a fragmented form that allowed both her and her audience (in this case,
myself and two peers) to grapple with the unsettling reality of the way this violent moment (what
Susan Brison aptly termed a “surd”) had challenged her ability to conceive of her story as a
linear narrative.
There is obviously no “correct” way to write trauma. Some of the writers in my class
who engage with memories of violence and violation indeed produce “trauma and redemption”
narratives in order to make sense of the trauma they’ve undergone. I will always respond to these
texts according to the wishes of my students, making sure to connect them to outside resources if
they wish. Some students do not wish to share such stories with the entire class, a choice which I
will always respect. Yet some of the most powerful moments in my classes have occurred when
students do choose to share such narratives in full-class workshops. This past semester, I was
struck by the sophisticated conversation about the cohesiveness (or lack thereof) of self, and the
relationship between the body, lived experience, and narrative, that arose when a student
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presented her “trauma and redemption” narrative to the class. The response to the content of the
story—which detailed the writer’s memories of child abuse in blunt and unapologetic terms—
was overwhelmingly empathetic. However I was also impressed when other students picked up
on something that had been troubling me personally—the jarring note between the searing
content of the piece and the “happily ever after” conclusion. One student began by hesitantly
offering the comment, “When you transitioned from your narrative into you conclusion, it started
to sound more like an essay?” Another said, “The violence in the rest of your piece sticks with
me more than your finishing statement that you’re grateful that you’re a stronger person now.”
The student who wrote the piece responded that she “thought that’s what conclusions were
supposed to do.” The lingering idea that stories should have happy endings is one of the
concepts I hope my students can—when they wish—push back against in productive ways.
When this particular student chose to re-write her piece with an ending she labeled “more
authentic,” I didn’t cringe at the word authentic, because I knew exactly what she meant.
While the genre of the “personal essay” or “personal narrative” may indeed be helpful for
students attempting to make sense of their experiences, it has also been important for me to
remember that “traumatic memories […] are not encoded like the ordinary memories of adults in
a verbal, linear narrative that is assimilated into an ongoing life story” (Herman 37). Linear
narrative may not always be an appropriate form for students who attempt to make meaning of
their traumatic experiences; privileging the coherent “essay” can reify the idea that every story of
trauma must follow the prescriptive guidelines of the classic “trauma and redemption tale,”
despite the fact that such trauma might be unresolved. By becoming attuned to the ways in which
trauma-based texts may present themselves through techniques of fragmentation, elision, and
disruption, and by valuing the use of forms that do not demand closure, “correctness,” or finality,
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I have been able to veer away from expecting a particular sort of “conclusion” from my students’
narratives, and hopefully encouraged my students to critique the larger cultural purposes served
by “happy ending” tropes, particularly with regard to sexual assault and violence against
children.
*
“But how do you grade?”
This is a legitimate question. (It is also often the only question that some people have
after hearing about the kinds of classrooms some of my colleagues and I teach in, and the
heterogeneous work produced by our students.) I’m always been struck by Pat Belanoff’s
characterization of grading as “that dirty thing we do in the privacy of our own offices”—so
much so that I’ve become invested in doing everything I possibly can to make sure that the
looming specter of “grading” never interferes with my students’ ability to take risks (that may or
may not pay off), or to retain control over their pieces and processes.
Peter Elbow’s notion of contract grading is one of many ways writing teachers can
circumvent the conflation of meaningful assessment and grading. I’ve found that employing a
participation based contract (that takes into account in-class and on-line participation, as well as
a final portfolio) for course grades collectively frees me and my students from the notion that
individual texts are constructed to be “graded” on a scale of A through F. Thus, these texts are
free to function in ways that are student-designated. This past semester, for example, one student
wrote a collection of poems that I and her family were the sole audience for. They fulfilled one
of the assignment requirements, but the student chose other pieces to include in her final
portfolio. Another student chose to photograph the poster he had designed with his group for his
portfolio, while another included a paper he had written for a political science class that made
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use of our class conversations about subject position and ethical argument. As long as students
fulfill the basic requirements for assignments, they are free to choose which pieces they will
revise and include in the final on-line portfolio for the class. Student portfolio themes may reflect
content and/or process. One portfolio, entitled “A Girl and her Computer,” is a multimedia
portfolio that organizes the student’s texts (including a hyperlinked photo essay about a specific
on-line controversy she was involved in, a children’s book about technology, and links to the
songs that served as inspiration for her self-portrait) around her relationship with digital
technologies. Another, entitled “For the Mad Ones,” organizes pieces by genre (poetry; fiction;
memoir) around the student’s relationship with the work of the Beat Generation. Students also
designate the audience settings for their portfolios. Some students choose to make their eportfolios “public” (which means they will show up in Google searches). Others make their
portfolios private, giving only me access. One student last semester decided not to have an online presence at all due to the personal nature of her work, and instead handed me the final
portfolio in book form. In choosing the form and audience of their portfolio, students make
meaningful decisions about both content and design.
In addition, students collaboratively design rubrics that both they and I use to assess some
of their pieces according to their designated terms, and they provide me and their peers with
guided feedback questions to enable us to give meaningful, descriptive feedback of the pieces
they share with the class in in-class and on-line workshops. When we talk about revision, one of
the pieces we look at is Sophie Calle’s Exquisite Pain. Some students are entranced by her
ability to re-tell a singular narrative ninety-nine times, while others are quick to point out that,
while such constant revision may serve therapeutic or aesthetic goals, their own revision
processes vary drastically. In my early years of teaching, I got caught up in the idea of “radical
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revision” as a one size fits all pedagogical tool, consistently encouraging students to re-visit and
re-write their pieces from different angles. One semester, a student adamantly refused to return to
one of her earlier pieces, telling me she was “done.”
In The Queer Art of Failure, Judith Halberstam urges us to “[dismantle] the logics of
success and failure with which we currently live. Under certain circumstances failing, losing,
forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more
cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world” (2-3). Failing “can stand in contrast to
the grim scenarios of success that depend upon ‘trying and trying again’” (3). This insight
productively challenges one the traditional purposes of the composition classroom—the
facilitation of increasingly “correct” prose. It also suggests that there is perhaps a significant
limit to the “revision” process envisioned by many well-meaning teachers (my younger self
included). Some of my students indeed return to earlier texts—breaking open spots that their
classmates expressed confusion about, re-writing stale endings they felt compelled to tack on, or
re-purposing their narrative for various audiences. One student this semester, though—intrigued
by an idea I threw out in class one day of writing a series of introductions with no conclusions—
decided to design his final portfolio around the idea of asking questions that would remain
unanswered at this point.
Such flexible practices enable my students and me to engage with texts on their own
terms, rather than measuring how they fall short of some imagined ideal. I’m mindful that none
of these practices are new, but I’ve been pleased with the ways in which they’ve allowed me to
meaningfully veer away from error-based reading/assessment models that deny students the right
to their own language, content, and form.
*
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In her essay “New Life in This Dormant Creature,” theorist and educator Carmen Kynard
argues that when writing teachers continue to “enforce neo-formalist rules” with regard to
student compositions, we are in essence trying to make “colonization and management” easier,
saying to our students:
writing is the property that we stand at the door of. here’s what students gotta do
before we let them come in: wipe the bottom of your shoes—dress up real nice—
[…] don’t talk too loud—[…] press your suit and your hair…and then you can
come in. this ain’t about writing, communication, language, literacy. this is about
entrance requirements…and keeping some folks out. (34)
We begin each semester in my course by discussing the politics of “Standard English,”
and read several pieces (including work by Kynard; Gloria Anzaldua; and Teresa Hak Kyung
Cha) that bring together various dialects and languages. Students who incorporate dialogue in
other languages into their self-portraits often come to class workshops with questions about
whether or not they should include English translations of the passages. Last semester, a native
English speaker in one such group answered this question (asked by a student who had included
passages in Spanish) by saying, “I think it would disrupt the flow if you translated. We can look
it up if we want to, but the context tells us too. Plus, it seems like your target audience might be
bilingual.”
When designing a rubric for the piece with that same class, several of the students
introduced the term “grammar” as a potential category. This is always a rich moment for us as a
class, as we get to talk about what that word actually means in context. (If enough students are
interested, we’ll look at passages from Hartwell’s essay the following class.) With this particular
class, the debate became heated, with one group adamantly opposed to the inclusion of the term
“grammar” on the rubric. This led to a conversation about the difference between “grammar” and
“usage,” as well as the value proofreading for “typos” and the value of making deliberate, non-
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“standard” linguistic choices. One student expressed concern that he had used “slang” and
“contractions” in his piece. The class ended up voting on a final rubric category: “Makes
deliberate linguistic choices that are appropriate for the writer’s purpose.” I agreed that this
seemed like a much more meaningful category than the nebulous “grammar.”
The rubrics are helpful in making broad generalizations about what I and students see
“working” in various pieces, but most of the feedback we give each other is descriptive or
question-based. When I read and respond to student pieces, I am reading for meaning—I use a
pencil to make margin comments about questions I have or passages that are particularly
striking, and I finish with a letter to each student about what was working in the piece and my
own reactions as a reader, in accordance with their feedback questions. If students have specific
questions about usage, they will indicate that to me in their process letter, so I can read for that.
Other students will ask me to read for “clarity,” or to tell them how the piece makes me feel. We
also often meet one on one to further discuss their responses to my comments. A student recently
pointed out something huge that I had missed—she seemed relieved when I admitted that the
misreading was completely because I’d been distracted, and she asked if she could erase some of
my comments.
For me, it’s become crucial to make sure that the response process is as dialogic and
open-ended as possible. After several rounds of peer-review (including on-line responses, small
group, and full-class workshops), students have often already revised their pieces substantially
before they receive my written responses. The versions of the piece that are collected in the final
portfolio are sometimes the result of a great deal of negotiation between readers/writer. Other
times, they are not. While I want to make sure that every writer gets a variety of feedback in
various forms (both written and verbal) on their work in process, it is ultimately up to the writer
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to decide which version will be submitted at the end of the course, and to explain her choices in
her final portfolio reflection.
*
Inspired by the incredible diversity of the final portfolios my colleague and I reflect on at
our end of semester assessment seminars, I helped found a conference for first year writers at my
institution in 2008. With the goal of furthering the voices of student writers and their teachers
who believe the function of the composition classroom extends beyond the reproduction of
“academic” forms sometimes aligned with racist, classist, sexist, and homophobic impulses, the
conference aimed to offer alternate visions of the writing classroom: “enuf of these ventriloquist
routines where i put the words in my students’ mouths with the joke being that it looks like it
comes from them” (Kynard 36).
The first semester the conference was held, I was a bit anxious about what administrators
and faculty in other departments might take away from my students’ panel. Aware that the
rhetoric of composition as a “service discipline” is alive and well in many universities, I feared
that my students’ spoken word poetry, “Twilight” parodies, and documentaries about sneakercollecting might not seem to speak to their ability to transfer their impressive facility with genre,
rhetoric, and form to other courses. Yet every semester it becomes increasingly apparent to me
that my students are more than adept at presenting the connections between the critical and
creative in their work to an outside audience.
At a recent panel I put together of seniors who had taken my course as freshmen, my
students spoke eloquently and passionately about the work they had done in my course and the
relationship it had to their later courses. One young man who had written a forty page fiction
piece talked about how he’d realized his ability to write creatively was a strength for him, and
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had led him to switch to a major in advertising, where he was doing very well at an internship he
had. Another talked about how all the stress I had put him through about “showing not telling”
had been worth it as he pursued a career in journalism. While I would continue to argue that the
purpose of composition courses is not to “serve” other departments, I do find it noteworthy that
by participating in a flexible, supportive writing community, some students are able to discover
things about themselves as writers that they may not have had the opportunity to do otherwise.
*
In Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom, bell hooks writes:
“Like desire, language disrupts, refuses to be contained within boundaries” (167). The idea of
language as disruption is a valuable one for me. Too often, the tropes that dominate mainstream
public discourse about writing classes seem to come from paranoia about “eroding standards.”
My own students have shown me that by embracing a pluralistic and multimodal conception of
literacy, we can come to create meaning in ways that reflect our diverse experiences as we
critically interrogate the context in which this meaning is made.
As Jason Palmeri writes in Remixing Composition: A History of Multimodal Writing
Pedagogy: “[I]f we seek to value the diverse embodied knowledges of all students and teachers
in the field of composition, we must embrace a capacious vision of multimodal pedagogy that
includes both digital and non-digital forms of communication: live oratory and digital audio
documentary; quilting and video gaming; paper-based scrapbooking and digital storytelling;
protest chanting and activist video making” (160). By broadening a more traditional
understanding of “composition,” writing teachers can create spaces for our students to engage
with the content of their lives in ways that make sense for them.
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As my semester winds down, I look at text after text, never knowing exactly what it is
I’m going to be engaging with. I’m excited to read The Communist Manifesto re-designed as a
children’s book; a blog about cruelty-free cosmetics; and a 20 page research narrative that
connects a writer’s life to her grandmother’s life through recipes. Not every piece will achieve its
goals or veer into uncharted territory, but each has been composed in a space constructed around
the idea that “because there can be terrible surprises, there can also be good ones” (Sedgwick
146).
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Conclusion

As we reveal ourselves in story, we become aware of the continuing core of our
lives under the fragmented surface of our experience. We become aware of the
multifaceted, multichaptered ‘I’ who is the storyteller. We can trace out the
paradoxical and even contradictory versions of ourselves that we create for
different occasions, different audiences [...] Most important, as we become aware
of ourselves as storytellers, we realize that what we understand and imagine
about ourselves is a story.
—Susan Wittig Albert
In her introduction to the collection Veterans of War, Veterans of Peace, Maxine Hong
Kingston writes: “We tell stories and we listen to stories in order to live. To stay conscious. To
connect one with another. To understand consequences. To keep history. To rebuild civilization”
(1). From published memoirs to courtroom testimony to college writing, the construction of
stories has a special significance for women whose lives have been disrupted by trauma. While
the connection between storytelling and survival is complex, the act of piecing together
meaningful narratives in the presence of a (real or imagined) witness can facilitate personal, as
well as cultural, transformation.
There’s obviously danger in uncritically embracing the idea of a cohesive, unified self,
but the concept of an “integrated psyche” necessary for survival seems a fruitful one when
considering the meaning-making process of trauma recovery. The work of trauma theorists from
Sandor Ferenczi to Judith Herman has demonstrated that a viable construction of self provides an
important basis for making sense of trauma. This is precisely why Ferenczi sought to provide the
kind of environment in which his patients could “re-assemble” the fragments of their psyches
into functional selves, creating narratives that could sustain them as they moved through their
lives. The idea of narrating a story does not imply foreclosure on meaning, but rather a
provisional unity necessary for self-sustenance.
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While Ferenczi’s intensely dialogic therapeutic model shows the ways in which the
speaking/listening/responding process can lead to individual meaning-making, such a model also
has a function beyond facilitating personal well-being, as evidenced by the work of writers and
activists such as Kingston. The act of artistic creation can become an act of community-creating
as well. Empathetic witnessing practices can challenge popular scripts about traumatic events
such as rape and child abuse. As Cha reminds us in Dictee, part of the reason for speaking the
past is “not to repeat history in oblivion” (33). Stories must be transmitted so that change can be
enacted. The sharing of trauma can connect its victims and their witnesses in moments of
meaningful transformation, as in the case of Kingston’s workshop for veterans, where not only
the writing of stories, but their sharing, is a significant part of the meaning-making process. As
Judith Herman remarks:
Traumatic events destroy the sustaining bonds between individual and
community. Those who have survived learn that their sense of self, of worth, of
humanity, depends upon a feeling of connection to others. […] Trauma isolates;
the group re-creates a sense of belonging. Trauma shames and stigmatizes; the
group bears witness and affirms. […] Trauma dehumanizes the victim; the group
restores her humanity. (214)

Ultimately, I hope this project illuminates some of the diverse avenues through which
victims of trauma may regain control of their stories and their lives, as well as some of the ways
in which we as witnesses can respond to narratives of trauma from spaces of openness, belief,
and reciprocity. Those who make the choice to engage with the difficult, often painful truths
embedded in the texts of women who break the silence of trauma are entrusted with a
responsibility to respond in an ethical, empathetic way. In the words of Audre Lorde: “[W]here
the words of women are crying to be heard, we must each of us recognize our responsibility to
seek those words out, to read them and share them and examine them […] For we have been
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socialized to respect fear more than our own needs for language and definition, and while we
wait in silence for that final luxury of fearlessness, the weight of that silence will choke us” (23).
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